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But now it is time to go away, I to die and you to live. Which of
us goes to a better thing is unclear to everyone except to the god.
Plato's Apology of Socrates
I.

INTRODUCTION

Anyone who writes about the death penalty faces a dual challenge. In addition to reporting and analyzing the case law and legislation surrounding the topic, one must address the social factors
in this emotionally charged issue. The goal of this article is not to
present an exhaustive report of capital punishment law; rather, this
1. This special project represents the efforts of the Loyola University of Chicago Law
Journal staff. Each section's author(s) appear under their individual by-lines. The
Editors especially wish to thank Jeffrey Colman of the law firm Jenner and Block,
without whom this project could not have been possible. The Editors also wish to thank
Kurt Feuer of the law firm Ross and Hardies, who provided valuable insight.
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project's objective is to recount first hand the views and opinions of
the people most directly involved in the capital punishment
process.
The staff has interviewed former death row inmates, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and members of public interest
groups. These people tell surprising, even shocking stories. Few
legal issues prompt such intense controversy. To many, no other
legal issue should merit more attention. Yet despite the disparity
in the opinions expressed by those interviewed, one thing is clear:
when the state prepares to take a person's life, lawyers play a critical role in assuring that justice is done.
First, a brief legal and sociological overview of the death penalty
presents background information to place the interviews in the
proper framework. The interviews follow that introduction.
II.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY

Robert Robertson
On September 12, 1990, Illinois executed Charles Walker. He
was the first person to die under the current version of the Illinois
death penalty statute. 2 The accompanying media coverage provided much information about Illinois' first execution since 1962.
Lost in the frenzy was a single, essential question: is the Illinois
death penalty statute constitutional?
Case law suggests that the statute does not violate the federal or
state constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court consistently upholds the constitutionality of the death penalty.3 The United
States Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of
the current Illinois statute, but has found similar statutes constitutionally acceptable.' In 1989, however, a United States District
Court declared the Illinois statute unconstitutional in United States
ex rel. Silagy v. Peters.5 Although the Seventh Circuit reversed the
lower court decision 6 and the United States Supreme Court denied
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(d) (1989).
3. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 561 N.E.2d 57 (1990), cert. denied,
No. 90-6682 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1991) (WESTLAW, Federal library, SCT file); People v. Bean,
137 Il1. 2d 65, 560 N.E.2d 258 (1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-6541 (U.S. Dec. 17,
1990); People v. Lewis, 88 I11.2d 129, 430 N.E.2d 1346 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1011 (1982); People ex reL Carey v. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531, 397 N.E.2d 809 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 953 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. 713 F. Supp 1246 (C.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1024 (1991).
6. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1024 (1991).
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certiorari, v Silagy remains an instructive case study on the constitutional issues surrounding the Illinois death penalty statute.
Charles Silagy confessed to and was convicted of the brutal murder of his two female roommates. Proceeding pro se at the sentencing portion of the trial, Silagy asked the jury to impose death,
which it did.' The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence. 9 Silagy later unsuccessfully attempted to gain postconviction relief. 1

In challenging his conviction through federal habeas corpus, Silagy alleged that the trial proceedings violated his constitutional
rights under the fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. 1'
Silagy also facially attacked the constitutionality of the Illinois
statute by arguing that it gives the prosecutor too much discretion
over whether the death penalty will be imposed. Finally, Silagy
contended that the Illinois death penalty statute fails to provide
adequate notice that the prosecution will seek the death penalty.
The district court rejected all of Silagy's contentions concerning
the constitutionality of the trial procedures. The court, however,
found merit in both of Silagy's arguments that the Illinois death
penalty statute is unconstitutional.
First, the court found that the statute unconstitutionally vests
absolute discretion in the prosecutor to determine when to ask the
court for the death penalty. The district court noted that the absolute nature of the prosecutorial discretion contained in the statute
raises eighth amendment concerns.' 2 Interestingly, the court observed that four Illinois Supreme Court justices had adopted the
position, at one time or another, that the Illinois statute violates
the eighth amendment. Further, the court determined that the Illinois statute "allows the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty."'

3

7. 111 S.Ct. 1024 (1991).
8.

Silagy, 713 F. Supp. at 1248. Silagy told the jury:

I have no desire to sit in no man's penitentiary. That's not a cop-out, and that's
not a plea. What I am asking the jury is do not feel sympathy, feel empathy. If
you can wear these I l's right now, do so.
...I

will say this: I do want the death penalty; and I will go to any lengths to

have it served upon me. I took two lives through my own foolishness, not nobody else's fault. Id.
9. People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 461 N.E.2d 415, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
10. People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 507 N.E.2d 830, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873

(1987).
11.

Silagy, 713 F. Supp. at 1248.

12.

Id. The statute provides that the death penalty may only be considered "[w]here

requested by the State." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(d) (1989).
13. Silagy, 713 F. Supp. at 1258.
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As an example of the arbitrary nature of the Illinois statute, the
district court noted that prosecutors may disagree on whether the
death sentence should be imposed in a particular case.14 The court
stated that "because of the lack of adequate guidelines the decision
to request a penalty hearing will, to a great degree, depend upon
the whim of the individual prosecutor. Without legislatively enacted guidelines, the differences in prosecutors, though they be sincere in their beliefs, will inevitably lead to arbitrary and capricious
action." 15 The lack of legislative guidelines was the key point in
the court's decision. Applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard established by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v.
Georgia16 and Furman v. Georgia, 7 the district court stated that
the Illinois statute provides no checks to prevent or " 'minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action'" by the prosecutor. 18 Therefore, the court concluded, the Illinois statute is
unconstitutional.
The district court in Silagy also deemed the Illinois statute unconstitutional because it gives inadequate notice to the defendant
that the death penalty will be sought. This lack of notice, the court
stated, violated Silagy's fourteenth amendment right to due process
and his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Relying on an Illinois Supreme Court dissent, the district court
emphasized the importance of early notice to the defendant that
the prosecution will seek the death penalty. The court noted that
the defendant's "decisions on what type of defense will be made,
what plea bargaining can be done, and whether a jury trial will be
waived" may turn on the prosecution's decision to seek the death
penalty.' 9 The district court accordingly affirmed Silagy's conviction, but ordered that he be resentenced because the death penalty
was imposed under an unconstitutional statute.2 °
The Seventh Circuit, however, reinstated Silagy's death sentence.2" Judge Kanne, writing for the court, rejected Silagy's facial
14. For example, in People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980), the Illinois Attorney General admitted during oral argument in a federal habeas corpus proceeding that the death penalty had been imposed erroneously. See Silagy, 713 F. Supp. at
1259.
15. Silagy, 713 F. Supp. at 1259.
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
17. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
18. Silagy, 713 F. Supp. at 1259 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189).
19. Id. (citing People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531, 397 N.E.2d 809 (1979)
(Ryan, J., dissenting)).
20. Id. at 1260.
21. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1024 (1991).

1990]

The Death Penalty

attacks on the Illinois statute. Judge Kanne stated that the district
court incorrectly held that the Illinois statute is "arbitrary and capricious" under the Gregg standard, which requires "that any discretion afforded a sentencing body in imposing the death penalty
.. .be narrowly channelled. ' 22 The appellate court determined
that a prosecutor is not a "sentencing body"; therefore, the discretion vested in the prosecutor need not be channelled narrowly.
The court noted that the judge or jury actually imposes the sentence, not the prosecutor. Thus, the court distinguished "the prosecutor's role [in] initiating the proceedings" from the sentencing
body's decision to impose the death sentence.23
Although the Illinois statute is unique in allowing the prosecutor
to exercise discretion after the verdict is returned, the appellate
court in Silagy found the prosecutor's exercise of "fundamental
discretionary authority" under the Illinois statute no different than
the discretion exercised in other states in which the prosecutor
seeks the death penalty before trial. The court likened the Illinois
statute to the Georgia statute held constitutional in Gregg, noting
that in both cases the prosecutor must prove "a specific element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" before the death penalty
may be imposed. 24 Furthermore, the court stated that giving the
prosecutor posttrial discretion may be a superior system because it
allows the prosecutor to consider all of the trial information in determining whether to seek a sentence of death.
The Seventh Circuit also reversed the district court's holding
that lack of pretrial notice under the Illinois statute violates the
sixth amendment. Applying the standard established in Strickland
v. Washington25 and United States v. Cronic,2 6 the court found that
lack of pretrial notice does not "interfere with defense counsel's
ability to provide effective representation to such a degree that ineffective assistance of counsel may be presumed. ' 27 The court stated
that such a presumption may arise if the defendant shows that
" 'the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could
provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate.' "28 Moreover, the court did not follow the district court's approach of recognizing defense counsel's need to
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 991 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (emphasis added).
Id. at 993.
Id. at 993-94.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
466 U.S. 648 (1984).
Silagy, 905 F.2d at 994.
Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984)).
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know that death' will be sought. Rather, the court focused on the
likelihood that defense counsel already has constructive notice
before trial that the death penalty may be sought. Therefore, the
court found it unnecessary to provide "certain" pretrial notice.
Additionally, the court listed some potential hazards of requiring certain pretrial notice. For example, the court suggested that
mandating this type of notice would create an "untenable constitutional dilemma. '29 Whereas Silagy alleged that posttrial notice unconstitutionally impeded his defense, a pretrial notice requirement,
the court argued, would produce similar results. Under such a
rule, the court postulated that the prosecution's subsequent withdrawal of its pretrial request to seek the death penalty would enable the defendant to raise a sixth amendment argument that he
would have adopted a different defensive strategy had he only
known that death would not be sought. Pretrial notice also would
prevent the prosecutor from evaluating the evidence presented at
trial before determining whether to seek the death penalty. The
court therefore concluded that the Illinois statute does not violate
the sixth amendment. °
Judge Ripple's dissent in Silagy focused on a constitutional issue
not raised by the defendant. Applying the recent Supreme Court
decision in Blystone v. Pennsylvania,3 ' Judge Ripple questioned
whether the Illinois statute provides enough specific guidance to
the sentencing jury, especially considering the defendant's burden
to produce mitigating evidence. The statute's provision that the
29. Id.
30. The Seventh Circuit also rejected Silagy's contention that the Illinois statute unconstitutionally shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that a death sentence is unwarranted. In rejecting Silagy's argument, the court stated that the Illinois statute
provides the sentencing body with adequate guidance to decide when the death sentence
is appropriate and upon whom the burden of proof falls. Moreover, the court found
constitutionally acceptable the statute's imposition of the burden of persuasion on the
defendant after the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is eligible
for the death penalty.
The court disposed of Silagy's two remaining constitutional challenges with "little discussion." Silagy contended that the statute fails to provide for "comparative proportionality review," which requires "a reviewing court to determine to some degree whether a
sentence is disproportionate to that which has been imposed in other similar cases." Id.
at 1000. The court found, however, that such procedural safeguards are not mandated by
the Constitution. Silagy's final contention was that the statute fails to "provide a means
of assuring that all of the aggravating factors relied upon by the sentencer are relevant or
constitutionally permissible." Id. The court retorted, however, that the statute expressly
provides that the sentencing body should consider only those factors " 'which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty.' "Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
9-1(c) (1989)).
31. 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).
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mitigating factors "must be sufficient to 'preclude' death" may fail
to give the jury adequate guidance, Ripple wrote.32 Specifically,
the jury is never instructed that for the death sentence to be imposed, the aggravating factors must outweigh the mitigating factors. According to Judge Ripple, the ambiguity of the term
"preclude" might allow the jury to return a sentence of death, even
though the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors.
Although the Seventh Circuit declared the Illinois statute constitutional, many questions clearly remain. The amount of
prosecutorial discretion, lack of notice to the defendant, or absence
of jury guidance in the sentencing phase could each be an independent basis for finding the Illinois statute unconstitutional.
Apparently, these issues will remain unanswered for some time in
the wake of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Silagy.3
Nevertheless, the debate on the propriety of the death penalty undoubtedly will continue. This debate centers around the more difficult questions of the moral, sociological, and economic
implications of the death penalty.
III.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Theresa Fehringer
A growing number of countries have found that the death penalty is an inappropriate response to crime.34 Nevertheless, recent
polls indicate that seventy-five percent of Americans favor the
death penalty, an increase from fifty-seven percent in 1972.3' Because American opinion runs contrary to world trends on this issue, the sociological aspects of the death penalty in America
demand attention.
A.

Deterrence

The most frequently cited theory supporting the death penalty is
that it will deter future crime. Obviously, executing a murderer
32. Silagy, 905 F.2d at 1013 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
33. See 111 S.Ct. 1024 (1991).
34. Horgan, The Death Penalty: Most Americans Favor It, but What Purpose Does It
Serve?, ScI. AM., July 1990, at 17. "Portugal abolished [the death penalty] in 1976; Denmark in 1978; Nicaragua and Norway in 1979; France in 1981; the Netherlands in 1982;
Australia in 1985; the Philippines and East Germany in 1987; Cambodia, New Zealand
and Romania in 1989; and Namibia [in 1990]." Id.
35. Id. The death penalty exists in 37 of the 50 states. Bailey & Peterson, Murder
and Capital Punishment.: A Monthly Time-Series Analysis of Execution Publicity, 54 AM.
Soc. REV. 722 (1989).
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permanently deters him from killing.36 But the question remains
whether this punishment deters others from committing capital
offenses.
Until the mid-1970s, most social scientists believed that the
death penalty did not provide an effective deterrent to murder.3 7
In 1975, however, Isaac Ehrlich 38 challenged this consensus and
found that consistent imposition of the death penalty upon murderers lowers the homicide rate.39 Researchers greeted Ehrlich's
study with a great deal of skepticism. Attempts to re-create his
results failed, and researchers concluded that his work suffered
from statistical and methodological faults. Post-Ehrlich research
seemed to affirm the consensus that the death penalty does not deter crime.
This revitalized consensus, however, again met challenge. In a
1987 work, Steven Stack studied the relationship between execution publicity and monthly homicide rates in the United States.'
Stack found "a significant decline in homicide rates for months
with highly publicized executions, but only a chance association
for cases receiving moderate or little publicity."4 William C. Bailey and Ruth D. Peterson, however, could not re-create Stack's
results; they were unable to conclude that any patterns in homicides after publicized executions were not due solely to chance.42
Bailey and Peterson based their analysis on the cumulative effects of capital punishment. They concluded that individuals living
in a capital punishment state run a statistically greater risk of becoming a homicide victim than individuals living in a state without
the death penalty.4 3 Although Bailey and Peterson found that ex36. Horgan, supra note 34, at 17.
37. Bailey & Peterson, supra note 35, at 722. This consensus was based on early
sociological studies dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Id.
38. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life orDeath,
65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
39. Bailey & Peterson, supra note 35, at 723.
40. Stack, Publicized Executions and Homicide, 1950 - 1980, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 532
(1987).
41. Id. at 538.
42. Bailey & Peterson, supra note 35, at 729.
43. Id. at 739. A study by Edmond G. "Pat" Brown and Michael A. Kroll found
that in the 14 days following the 1979 execution of John Spenkelink in Florida, the murder rate in Florida rose 16%. Brown and Kroll also cited a study that found two or three
more murders than expected in New York within a 30-day period following every execution in that state since 1930. The Examined Life: Killing Is No Way to Stop Murder, U.S.
CATHOLIC, Apr. 1990, at 2. Brown and Kroll concluded that" '[t]he death penalty is not
only bad morality, but it is bad law enforcement' and 'puts our lives at greater peril.'"
Id.
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ecutions appear to have a statistically significant deterrent effect on
homicides immediately following an execution, they concluded
that "whatever deterrent effect ... might have been realized is of
minor significance by comparison with the cumulative effect of executions."" In sum, Bailey and Peterson found that "for periods
ranging through one year after executions, the overall effect of executions on homicide rates was essentially zero."' 4 They concluded that no reason exists to question the current consensus that
capital punishment does not effectively deter murder."
B.

Retribution

Some Americans' views are responses to an increase in violent
crimes. This response reflects the public's belief in the retributive
theory of capital punishment. Under the retributive theory, convicts deserve death because of their antisocial behavior.4
Bailey
and Peterson observe that "[t]his argument rests upon a matter of
belief and cannot be demonstrated or refuted empirically."4 "
George N. Boyd argues that opponents of capital punishment
should partially accept the retributists' argument and agree that
many individuals on death row deserve to die.49 But Boyd points
out that debate about capital punishment is less about what murderers deserve than about how society should express and defend
its fundamental values. Boyd argues that "[t]he most fundamental
argument for discontinuing the death penalty is that society can
best express the seriousness of its commitment to the sanctity of
human life by abstaining from taking it, despite having justifiable
0
cause." 5
C. Race
One of the most disturbing aspects of the death penalty is the
possibility of error or prejudice in its administration.51 In 1990,
African-Americans, who comprise twelve percent of the popula44. Bailey & Peterson, supra note 35, at 739.
45. Id; see also Wilkes, Murder in Mind, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, June 1987, at 27
(profile of another study finding that the death penalty has no deterrent effect).
46. Bailey & Peterson, supra note 35, at 739.
47. Id. at 722.
48. Id.
49. Boyd, CapitalPunishment: Deserved and Wrong, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 17,
1988, at 162.
50. Id. at 163 (emphasis in original).
51. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, evidence of racial bias in sentencing was one
factor that convinced the Supreme Court to rule against the death penalty. See Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-57 (1972).
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tion, accounted for forty percent of the 2347 prisoners on death
row.52 Current studies indicate that the race of the murder victim
is the most significant factor in whether a defendant receives the
death penalty.5 3 Since 1976, eighty-four percent of those executed
murdered a white person, even though half of the murder victims
in the United States are black. No white person had been executed
for killing a black victim in that period.54
These statistics recently were presented to the Supreme Court in
McCleskey v. Kemp.55 McCleskey's attorneys challenged Georgia's
death penalty statute based on its racist implementation. In a
study used by the inmate's attorneys, Professor David Baldus
found that a black defendant was approximately twenty-two times
more likely to receive a death sentence for killing a white person
than for killing 'a black person.56
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell held that the Baldus
study indicated at most "a discrepancy that appears to correlate
with race."" Justice Powell contended, however, that "apparent
disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system." Accordingly, the majority held that discrimination
against McClesky would have to be shown specifically. 58 The
Court feared that had it ruled otherwise, it would face similar
claims regarding other types of criminal penalties.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated that the majority was
"shrinking" from evidence that clearly showed "a devaluation of
the lives of black persons." 59 In response to the majority's concern
about the risks of future sentencing procedures if McClesky's claim
were upheld, Justice Brennan felt that the court seemed to shy
away from "too much justice." 6 The four dissenters agreed that
Baldus's evidence showed a pattern unexplainable on grounds
other than race. 6 '
52. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. 1 (May 30,
1990).
53. Horgan, supra note 34, at 18.
54. Id.
55. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
56. Dugger, The Numbers on Death Row Prove that Blacks Wo Kill Whites Receive
the HarshestJudgment, LIFE, Spring 1988, at 91.
57. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312.
58. Id. at 292.
59. Id. at 335-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61.

Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the dissent.
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D.

Juveniles and Individuals with Mental Deficiencies

Since 1976, six of the more than ninety individuals executed in
the United States had serious mental disabilities. It is uncertain
how many more inmates with mental deficiencies currently await
execution. One study suggests that "there may be as many as 250
mentally retarded inmates [presently] on death rows across the
' '62
nation.
Experts have found that mentally retarded people are no more
prone to criminal behavior than others, but a disproportionate
number of them are convicted because they fail to grasp the workings of the criminal justice system and because their lawyers cannot meet their special needs. Furthermore, the National Institute
of Corrections, a branch of the United States Justice Department,
has found that "[i]t is unlikely that they will receive special programming in corrections and even less likely that they will be
transferred to other agencies
where such special programming is
'63
more readily available.
Professor James W. Ellis believes that a high percentage of mentally retarded inmates are innocent. 64 In support of his view, Ellis
referred to a client who could be made automatically to respond
"yes" or "no" to questions based on their phrasing. Ellis stressed
that the primary problem with executing such individuals is that
"many mentally retarded defendants are tried and convicted without the nature of their handicap ever being properly disclosed to
the jury."6 5 One contributing factor to this problem is that courts
often treat mental illness and mental retardation as if they are the
same when in fact they are not. "Mental illness is a disease affecting one's ability to behave rationally. It can often be cured.
Mental retardation impairs one's ability to learn and to adapt to
social norms. It is caused by brain injury, genetic disorder, or poor
prenatal care .... [It] can never be 'cured.' "66
Confusion in the courts between mental retardation and mental
illness adds to the problem of imposing the death penalty on the
mentally handicapped. This confusion arises from state laws that
govern the determination of whether the defendant is competent to
stand trial. These laws often measure the defendant's sanity, not
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Reid, Low IQ Is a Capital Crime, PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1988, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
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The question of the defendant's competency also arises when determining whether to impose the death penalty. Recently, in Ford
v. Wainwright,68 the United States Supreme Court held that before
execution, the court must administer a test to determine whether
the condemned prisoner understands the crime as well as the punishment. Although such a ruling seems helpful to mentally retarded death row inmates, it remains unclear whether the Supreme
Court's interpretation of competence for execution adequately differentiates the problems faced by mentally retarded offenders from
those affecting mentally ill offenders.
Another area of concern is whether the execution of juveniles
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In Thompson v.
Oklahoma,69 the court vacated the death sentence of a fifteen-yearold murderer. A four-Justice plurality found a national consensus
that minors should not be executed. Three dissenting justices denied that any such consensus existed. Justice O'Connor cast the
final vote to reverse the sentence. She agreed that a consensus may
exist, but would not adopt it as a matter of constitutional law. Justice O'Connor reasoned that because the defendant was convicted
as a result of an Oklahoma statute that allows the state to prosecute some minors as adults, the state had not given "the question
the serious consideration that would have been reflected in the explicit choice of some minimum age for death-eligibility.

' 70

Justice

O'Connor concluded that unless a state's capital punishment statute specifies a minimum age for death-eligibility, the death penalty
should not be imposed upon those who were under sixteen at the
time of their offense. Although Justice O'Connor clearly set forth
her view about the minimum age necessary to make a defendant
death-eligible, the case produced no dispositive majority opinion
on that issue.
E.

Competent Counsel

Another issue in the capital punishment arena is the availability
of competent counsel to defend capital cases. In a recent speech
prepared for the American Bar Association, Justice Marshall
stated that "the single biggest problem with the implementation of
the death penalty in this country is the lack of competent, exper67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
Id. at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ienced counsel to handle capital trials and direct and collateral appeals." 71 Justice Marshall added that on many occasions capital
defendants with meritorious arguments for escaping the death penalty have been condemned because counsel did "little or nothing
on their behalf." Marshall stressed that if the capital penalty is to
continue, it "must include measures to provide competent counsel
at all stages of the process." He implored lawmakers to "mandate
that states provide a professional corps of experienced counsel to
handle capital cases."
At the same ABA meeting, Justice Stevens participated in a
panel discussion on the death penalty.72 Justice Stevens agreed on
the need for competent counsel in death cases and reasoned that if
the state can support the prosecution, it can also provide competent defense counsel. He added, "The primary cause for the great
delay that occurs in the review of capital punishment cases is the
fact that in many, many cases either no counsel [has been appointed for state] collateral review or ... counsel has not done an

effective job in the direct trial." Although other members of the
panel suggested that individual lawyers, bar associations, and law
schools train lawyers in death penalty cases, Justice Stevens stated
that volunteer methods have failed in the past and urged the states
to provide more competent attorneys to defend such cases.
F

Habeas Reform

A habeas corpus petition allows state inmates to appeal for federal review of alleged constitutional defects in state court proceedings.7 3 In 1989, the American Bar Association appointed the Task
Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus to commence hearings for
the purpose of recommending habeas reform. After eighteen
months of study, the Task Force found that "'the post-conviction
process of reviewing capital convictions and sentences is, on the
one hand, too long and slow and, on the other hand, susceptible to
unfair outcomes due to the inadequate presentation of constitutional issues.' "" The Task Force made the following recommendations: (1) a one-year statute of limitations on all postconviction
applications in capital cases; (2) qualified, adequately compensated
counsel throughout the process; (3) limited federal review of claims
that were waived in the lower courts; (4) stay of executions con71.
72.
73.
74.

Chicago Daily L. Bull., Aug. 8, 1990, at 2, col. 2.
Id. at 3, col. 3.
McMillion, Death Penalty, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 108.
Id.
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strained by the one-year statute of limitations until completion of
the initial federal habeas corpus proceeding; and (5) restrictions on
the filing of multiple federal habeas petitions. Time will tell
whether these recommendations will reduce the long delays,
crowded dockets, and arbitrariness at work in the capital punishment process.
IV.

A.

INTERVIEWS

The Prosecutors

Michael Leonard and Robert Robertson
[T]hat societal anger that exists when you pick up the morning
paper is good. That is the concern for your fellow citizen, that is
the concern for whom the bell tolls, and that concern ought to be
satisfied. Whether you call that satisfying a blood lust, fine, so be
it. But that's human civilization, and when a society stops caring
about the lives of innocent victims, then it's not a society any
longer."
The Journalinterviewed prosecutors William J. Kunkle, Patrick
O'Brien, and Terence Madsen. Kunkle, presently a partner with
Pope & John, spent thirteen years with the Cook County State's
Attorneys Office, serving as First Assistant State's Attorney, Chief
of the Criminal Prosecutions Bureau, and Chief of the Felony Trial
Division. Patrick O'Brien is now Chief of the Criminal Prosecutions Bureau. Terence Madsen currently heads the Criminal Appeals Division at the Illinois Attorney General's office.
The prosecutors were first asked to explain how they view their
role in death penalty prosecutions. Madsen views prosecutors at
all levels as "counsel for the people," with the people as the prosecutor's client. At the appellate level in which he operates, Madsen
sees the legislature as another client "who has an interest in the
constitutionality of the law [it] passed." Ultimately, with these two
classes of clients in mind, Madsen believes the prosecutor's role is
to "best serve his clients, just like any other lawyer."
Both O'Brien and Kunkle entered the State's Attorneys Office
when there was no death penalty in Illinois. Even after the new
Illinois death penalty statute went into operation in 1977, it took
time for crimes committed under the statute to reach trial. Consequently, the death penalty issue was not something they had to
confront consciously when they decided to become prosecutors.
75.

William J. Kunkle, former prosecutor.
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As Kunkle stated, at the time the "death penalty was an irrelevant
issue."
Eventually, however, Kunkle and O'Brien consciously had to
confront the death penalty. They both agree philosophically with
the death penalty, but consider their personal views on capital punishment to be irrelevant. They see the death penalty as the law of
Illinois; it has to be enforced as part of their duties as State's Attorneys. Kunkle said, "If you're not willing to enforce it, you should
get out of the business."
Both prosecutors underscored the importance of law school
graduates giving the death penalty thoughtful consideration before
becoming prosecutors. O'Brien emphasized that during the final
round of interviewing prospective prosecutors, he always asks the
candidates for their views on the death penalty. O'Brien urges prospective prosecutors to "look inside themselves," although he acknowledged that it is "hard to tell where your views will be in five
years" when you may actually have the opportunity to try a death
case. O'Brien said that if an applicant cannot reconcile his personal views with the death penalty statute, then "the job is not for
him."
The prosecutors were then asked to address the death penalty's
classic justifications of deterrence and retribution. In addressing
deterrence, O'Brien and Kunkle expressed with varying degrees of
conviction the idea that criminals take the death penalty into account before committing a crime.
O'Brien believes that in considering the death penalty, one must
first ask whether death is an appropriate sentence. He stressed that
deterrence is a secondary issue. Kunkle went further and labeled
the deterrence argument "a red herring." Although he does believe that the death penalty provides specific and general deterrence, Kunkle said that whether the death penalty deters anyone is
irrelevant.
O'Brien noted that he is "not typically able to ask" defendants
whether they considered the death penalty before committing the
crime. "I don't have the opportunity to talk to them." Further,
O'Brien said that it is "hard to get into their minds or to believe
them." He pointed out, however, that some crimes are "rationally
planned" and require a "great deal of thought or time so that we
can assume that they had time to think about what they were doing." O'Brien concluded that when the death penalty is "not just
on the books, but actually enforced, it can be considered a factor
by some defendants."
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Kunkle and Madsen provided support for O'Brien's theory.
Kunkle agreed with O'Brien's assessment of the general deterrence
value of the death penalty. He pointed out that "if you go back
and look at the history of Britain, where you had very severe sanctions against killing police officers, . . . guess what you had? A

society in which police officers didn't get killed and wounded."
Also, Kunkle related how "Charles Walker 76 was quite eloquent
on his experience in the penitentiary in talking to other inmates in
terms of their specific planning on particular jobs ... to carry a
plastic gun rather than a real one, . . . making a conscious decision

that they didn't want to get in a felony murder situation and expose themselves to the death penalty."
Moreover, Kunkle said that in looking back at typed confessions
and trial testimony, there appear "many examples of very brutal
criminals who nevertheless made conscious decisions about the
types of crimes to commit, how they were going to do it, and
whether they really had an intention to get a shooting involved."
Therefore, Kunkle said, the death penalty may not deter a murder
based on an "argument in the tavern," but it may deter other types
of murders.
Madsen and the others also recognize the specific deterrence
value of the death penalty. Madsen related that the bottom line is
"how do we stop Henry Brisbon or Charles Walker from killing
again?" Madsen said that when Walker made his taped statement
to the governor in July, he "threw down the gauntlet." Walker
said, "suppose you give me life imprisonment.... What's my incentive to be good? And if I decide to kill somebody, who are you
going to prosecute?" The prosecutors all agreed that the safety of
other inmates and the prison guards is an appropriate matter of
concern.
The prosecutors also endorse the idea of societal retribution as
an appropriate reason for implementing the death penalty. Madsen said that retribution serves as "a kind of societal safety valve
saying that there are certain crimes that we just won't tolerate.
76. Charles Walker was convicted of the double murder of an engaged couple.
Walker tied his victims to a tree, shot both, and robbed them of about $40. Walker was
sentenced to death and waived any appeals. He was executed by lethal injection on September 12, 1990, becoming the first person executed in Illinois in 28 years.
Kunkle was appointed by United States District Judge James B. Zagel to represent
Walker and to determine Walker's position on the then-pending class action suit. When
asked if he felt it inconsistent with his death penalty views to represent Charles Walker,
Kunkle responded that "whether it was consistent with my views was basically irrelevant.
What was important was that my representation was consistent with [Charles Walker's]
views."
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Also, in response to society dealing with its individual members,
we're saying that there are certain avenues for something that happens to you. This [criminal act] offends us as much as it offends
you. "

Madsen agreed that this societal safety valve might work more
efficiently if less time passed between a conviction and an execution. Madsen emphasized, however, the delicate balance between
the "need for accuracy and legality" and the "enforcement of the
law." Somewhere, Madsen stated, "there is a point where those
two things should be able to meet and make sense." He cautioned
that in death penalty cases, "you only get the one time around and
everything has to be done right."
On the other hand, Madsen said that "certainly swifter enforcement would better serve the 'goals' of the death penalty and the
reasons for it." He cited an inmate, convicted in Illinois in 1946,
on whom the Attorney General's Office still has an active case.
O'Brien expressed his belief that lengthy delays and multiple appeals are problems best addressed by the legislature.
Kunkle strongly agreed with Madsen's endorsement of retribution as a legitimate reason behind the death penalty. Kunkle noted
that for years, "revenge has been considered a dirty word and
77
maybe revenge isn't the right word. But in any event, as Berns
points out, that societal anger that exists when you pick up the
morning paper is good. That is the concern for your fellow citizen,
that is the concern for whom the bell tolls, and that concern ought
to be satisfied. Whether you call that satisfying a blood lust, fine,
so be it. But that's human civilization, and when a society stops
caring about the lives of innocent victims, then it's not a society
any longer. Capital punishment is not a disregard for human life
at all, but a total regard for the innocent lives of the citizen who is
the victim."
Similarly, Kunkle agreed with Madsen that society is dissatisfied
with the death penalty process and the length of time between conviction and execution. Kunkle noted that he dealt with the families of over one hundred murder victims as a prosecutor and that
the victim's family often comes to the system with unrealistic
expectations.
For example, Kunkle said that the family of a victim killed by
Richard Speck or John Gacy has "an appropriate and lawfully recognized expectation that the appropriate penalty might be death."
77.
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Conversely, he stated that families who have had a relative killed
in a situation that is not governed by the current statute often come
to court with that same expectation. Consequently, Kunkle said,
"it's the job of both the prosecutor and the judge to try to
straighten out those unrealistic expectations. But those expectations exist, and to totally discount them is to reject the basic feeling
of the worth of the life of the victim."
Further, Kunkle alluded to the efforts of death penalty foes to
"trot out the occasional victim's family, who because of their personal religious convictions or later conversions to the group involved say, 'Oh gee, we miss poor Johnny but we don't want this
killer executed.' " Kunkle said that such expressions of emotion in
"no way remove society's duty to follow its own law and to recognize its concept of human dignity in terms of the life of the innocent victim. The point is that it is no more the right of an
individual victim's family to decide this issue for the state or society than it is for the criminal to decide the life and death of his
victims."
The Journalnext asked the prosecutors if the Illinois statute allows prosecutors too much or too little discretion in determining
whether to seek the death penalty against a particular defendant.
In addition, the prosecutors were asked whether this discretion
poses any danger that a prosecutor might use the death penalty as
a "career move" or for personal aggrandizement.
O'Brien responded that the question of discretion is not the issue. He views the real question as whether the "Illinois death penalty statute is an appropriate statute." O'Brien stated that the
discretion embodied in the statute is a decision properly left to the
Illinois legislature. He takes the position that as written, the statute is appropriate. "I can only tell you how we carry the statute
out."
O'Brien indicated that prosecutorial discretion is necessary. For
instance, O'Brien said, "in a multiple homicide with multiple defendants, there are different levels of participation." Therefore,
considerations such as "whether a defendant was only the driver to
the location, the fact that he has prior convictions, and whether he
discussed the crime beforehand" all are appropriate in deciding
whether to seek the death penalty.
Madsen expressed the view that "the discretion in our statute is
not different than that in other states and it's no different from any
other type of crime. There is, and always has been, vested in the
executive branch of government, a clemency power, and there al-
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ways has been vested in the prosecutor the decision of which
crimes to charge. By deciding which crimes to charge, in most
cases, the prosecutors are able to control what sentences will be
imposed."
Kunkle agreed with Madsen and opined that the "Illinois statute
is preferable to other statutes in that it provides the discretion of
asking for a sentencing hearing after a finding of guilt. After a
trial, the prosecutor knows what has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and is in the best position to decide whether a sentencing hearing should go forward. He has the opportunity to exercise
discretion to grant mercy where it's clear from what's been proven
that a death penalty sentence isn't appropriate."
Kunkle also pointed out that after a trial, the converse may be
true. "The prosecutor may have evidence come out at trial that
makes the crime even more egregious and suggests that it's now
quite clear that the aggravating factors have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and that in fact it is an appropriate matter for the
death penalty." He noted that too much is made of the prosecutor's discretion under the Illinois statute. Under the death penalty
statutes in Texas, Florida, and Georgia, which do not on their face
provide the same discretion as the Illinois statute, the prosecutor,
said Kunkle, "really still does have the discretion."
For instance, "if a bigoted prosecutor decides that he's never going to issue a death penalty against a Norwegian, fine. He doesn't
have to charge Norwegians with capital murder. He can charge
them with regular murder, or he can charge the armed robbery
without the murder. Or, even though it was the killing of a policeman, he can draft an indictment that simply states it was the killing of an individual. The bottom line is that the prosecutor always
has the discretion to charge, and that's provided for by our constitutional system. It's whether you spell it out honestly or not."
Responding to the possibility that public, media, or outside pressures enter into charging decisions, Madsen said, "I would be surprised because you have to remember that there is an ultimate test
for whether you can or can't charge. If you can't meet the test,
you're going to lose the case. And if the case is a high-publicity
one, I don't see the incentives to going in under those
circumstances."
Kunkle was even more blunt in addressing whether a prosecutor
might use a death case for ulterior motives. "In Cook County,
unfortunately, there are so many cases available that to suggest
that in any particular case a decision would be made out of a desire
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for publicity or aggrandizement is actually kind of silly." He added, "it would be unusual to have a situation where the public
pressure was ill-informed. The basic facts of the crime are generally known, [as] are the basic data that provide the information on
whether you are going to seek the death penalty. I can't really
envision a situation where there would be a public clamoring for
the death penalty and aggravating factors didn't exist."
Interestingly, Kunkle believes that the same would hold true in
"a small downstate county that had its first capital offense case in
ten years." He stated, "Antideath groups make the argument that
prosecutors in some downstate counties or other... counties have
refused to enforce the death penalty because the county budget
can't afford the trial preparation costs or the cost of trial in light of
the resources of the state's antideath coalition. So, rather than
viewing it as an opportunity to enhance their careers, they're
deathly afraid of the situation and its monetary impact."
O'Brien views misuse of discretion as something that is dealt
with by our governmental system of checks and balances. He
again endorsed the system and said, "If there is a history of the
statute being used inappropriately, then the people have the right
to change the State's Attorney."
Both O'Brien and Kunkle agreed that the outcome of the case
may be affected by whether the defendant is given a bench or jury
trial. O'Brien stated that the more egregious the case, the more
likely that a prosecutor will request a jury trial. O'Brien explained,
"As judges have seen more violent crimes and more of man's inhumanity to man, they may become more jaded. [Conversely,] a juror who has probably never been presented with the details of a
violent crime is probably more sensitive to the brutality of the act."
O'Brien stated that this difference is most apparent in felony murder cases, in which the prosecutor will have to meet a "tougher
standard" to gain a conviction in bench trials.
Kunkle cautioned, however, that juries are not always easily sold
on the prosecution's case. "Jurors do not come into courtrooms,
regardless of their banter at cocktail parties or on radio talk shows,
prepared to execute someone. It is not something they confront on
a day-to-day basis. In a capital case, I absolutely refute the concept that jurors come in prosecution-minded, which may be a debatable point in a burglary or armed robbery case."
Kunkle also pointed out that a defense attorney's decision to recommend to his client a jury or bench trial in a death penalty sentencing hearing could be affected by which judge is presiding over
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the case. Kunkle stated, "Judges have reputations about the death
penalty just as they do with respect to sentencing in general. A
defense attorney who's in front of Judge 'A' may elect to take a
bench trial on a death penalty sentencing hearing, [but] if he's in
front of Judge 'B,' he'll elect to go to the jury with the same
case ....

It's a human system, so it's not going to be monolithic

and perfectly numerical and objective."
The prosecutors have divergent views on the amount of personal
satisfaction that they experience after a successful outcome in a
capital case. Asked whether he experiences personal satisfaction
after a successful capital prosecution, Kunkle responded, "Absolutely. That's one of the joys of being a prosecutor. There's a tremendous personal satisfaction in gaining an appropriate verdict
and an appropriate sentence after that verdict." Kunkle contrasted
his prosecutorial experience with his experience as a criminal defense attorney and stated, "As a defense lawyer, unless you truly
believe you have an innocent client, which is maybe one in ten
thousand cases, you have the opportunity of feeling only that you
won the game in the courtroom, so to speak.

'7 8

Conversely, Kun-

kle stated that as a prosecutor, "you've done justice and you've
also secured some safety for the citizenry."
Asked if there is more satisfaction in a capital case than in other
types of proceedings, Kunkle said, "Absolutely. Capital cases are
the toughest cases to try, the cases that the other side puts the most
effort into, and quite frankly the hardest case to sell to a jury. The
object of a prosecutor is to move them and convince them to do
something that they are very adverse to doing. Winning that case
is the ultimate satisfaction of a criminal trial prosecutor."
O'Brien, on the other hand, seemed to minimize or reject the
presence of any personal satisfaction and stated, "A death conviction does not bring back the victim." Rather, a death conviction
acts as a "catharsis for family, society, and victim, knowing there
was a need to give the ultimate penalty. Personally, the imposition
of the death penalty is never a happy day. Every conviction, particularly death convictions, points out a shortcoming in our society." Asked whether victory in a death penalty case is more
satisfying, O'Brien responded, "After a while you dwell less on the
victory than on the relief-the relief that your inadequacies as a
prosecutor did not allow them to walk free. You are glad that the
case did not come out the other way."
78. Kunkle stated that others have said "[G]ood trial lawyers are simply frustrated
jocks looking for a new arena in which to compete."
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Madsen stated that his job with the Illinois Attorney General's
Office, which represents the State in all federal habeas litigation
and cases before the Illinois and United States Supreme Courts, is
satisfying, but he denied that any one class of cases gives him
greater personal satisfaction. He stated, "Functioning at that level
of the criminal law [and] being able to discuss what the law should
be, makes you feel good about being a lawyer."
Madsen related his recent experiences with the Walker litigation. "In a period of a very few days we were in federal district
court, the Seventh Circuit, the U. S. Supreme Court, state circuit
court, and the Illinois Supreme Court in virtual nonstop litigation.
When all that was over, I wasn't pleased that I beat the other side
or that I had won out as a lawyer against lawyer kind of thing. I
believe that justice was served in that case."
Madsen continued, "There is not any case I'm involved in or
anyone on death row that I have any kind of 'Yeah-I-want-thisguy' or 'I-want-to-move-this-guy-through' attitude." He did state,
however, that "it does mean something to hear from victims, who
say, 'thanks for keeping us going and thanks for finally bringing
about the result that society promised us, especially after we began
to doubt whether society was capable of bringing about that result.'
To the extent that I am involved in the delivery of justice and can
accomplish justice, then I'm proud of what I do."
Celebration after the successful conviction or execution of a defendant is distasteful to Madsen. He stated, "Someone invited me
to a party after the Walker execution, and I refused to go. I
thought it was a kind of pathetic suggestion." Referring to reports
that prodeath supporters sang "Na, Na, Hey, Hey, Goodbye" after
the Walker execution, Madsen stated that "the justice system is not
well served by those kinds of spectacles surrounding an execution."
When questioned on whether the Walker case and execution will
have any effect on the death penalty process, Madsen responded,
"No. What's going to move death penalty cases along is the Silagy 79 case and cases like it that get constitutional and statutory
issues resolved. Hopefully, the system will compress a little bit just
as a result of that."
Kunkle also discussed the Walker litigation. Asked if he
thought his representation of Walker was inconsistent with his
79. Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1024 (1991).
Silagy unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty statute
on the grounds that it contains too much prosecutorial discretion. See supra notes 5-33
and accompanying text.
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death penalty views, Kunkle responded, "Whether it was consistent with my views or not was basically irrelevant. What was important was that my representation was consistent with his views.
Judge Zagel appointed me to represent him and basically to find
out what his position was on the class action suit, and I did that."
If Walker had changed his mind and wanted to stop the execution
during the last minutes or hours, Kunkle stated, "I would have
done everything in my power to halt that execution, and quite
frankly, it would have been halted. I had an agreement with the
Attorney General that they would agree to an order for the Southern District of Illinois. We had the judge's private phone numbers;
everything was all set up. Even if he had changed his mind right
up to the last minute, we could have in fact halted the process.
That was not his wish. He did not change his mind; he remained
completely steadfast."
Kunkle speculated that Walker chose not to delay the execution
because a reversal of the sentence was highly unlikely. Kunkle
stated, "You're talking about a guy that basically confessed, that
plead guilty, with little or no mitigating evidence available to him
and tremendous aggravating factors. There was really nothing to
review on any future appeals that hadn't been knowingly and intelligently waived."
When asked what would have happened if Walker had halted
the execution, Kunkle responded, "The judge could have denied a
last minute stay being fully appraised of the record. As a practical
matter, I think a judge would look at it and say, 'both sides ought
to brief it and we ought to look at it in a calm light of deliberation,
and therefore I'm going to issue a forty-eight hour stay or a thirty
day stay.' The strong probability is that you would have been in a
situation where the execution would have gone forward in a relatively short period of time regardless of [Walker's] position."
Madsen, who oversaw the Walker appeals on behalf of the state,
was asked whether persons other than the defendant should be able
to appeal a death sentence. Madsen responded, "Attempts to intervene are necessary at some point. Traditionally, the courts have
served as a vehicle for minorities-not just racial minorities, but
minorities on political questions. I don't think it is unreasonable
for persons in the minority on political questions to use the courts,
because it is important to ensure that... the goals of the Constitution and the letter of the Constitution are followed. At some point,
I think they become a burden on the system and a burden on society and our experience."
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Kunkle, who witnessed the execution, stated, "It was very
clinical. The Department of Corrections from top to bottom performed their functions very professionally and correctly. Everything worked as it was supposed to. It was plain to everyone that if
anything it would best be described as a peaceful demeanor that
Walker displayed, no twitching in pain, no grimacing, no outward
signs of any kind of discomfort at all."
Speaking on the method of execution, lethal injection, Kunkle
stated, "If the Illinois legislature's aim was to enforce the law and
continue to have capital punishment in Illinois, but at the same
time to do it in a humane or most humane way available, that's
exactly what was done."
Kunkle then was asked whether the public or the prosecutor
should witness the execution. Kunkle stated, "We hosted a young
man from Korea at the State's Attorneys Office several years ago
who was a prosecutor. He told us that in Korea, the prosecutor in
death penalty cases is routinely, although not in every instance,
required to not only attend the execution, but to pull the lever on
the gallows, the premise being that if you are going to ask for the
death sentence, you must be prepared to carry it out. And frankly,
I think that is appropriate."
All three prosecutors believe that televising executions would
not contribute to the criminal justice system or the public's knowledge. When questioned about televising executions, Kunkle stated,
"I have some strong feelings about that. I think that public executions do not serve the interests of justice or deterrence or public
education. There is some privacy right; that individual ought not
to be displayed in the public square."
Kunkle commented on the publicity surrounding the defendant
and the actual execution. "What I do not think serves society's
best interests is simply publicizing the candle light parade around
the penitentiary or the musings of the condemned killer. Frankly,
I'm not interested in what Gary Gilmore or Stephen Judy think
about life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness or the legal system
or anything else, or particularly what Ted Bundy thinks about
comic books causing crime. To give them a whole lot of coverage
before an execution does not serve any particularly good purpose."
Kunkle supports the first amendment, but thinks that if the "media wants something to put on TV at the time of the execution,. ..
it ought to put on a re-enactment of the crimes committed by that
individual." Kunkle said, "those watching can learn why it is that
society has justly decided to end that individual's life for the pro-
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tection of society and for the appropriate punishment for the
crimes committed."
Madsen views the question of televising executions from a practical prospective. He stated, "It would not greatly increase the deterrent value." Madsen stated that the inmate might also have
"some measure of privacy right." Legally, Madsen stated that the
ability to televise executions would come down to the "the weighing of the privacy interests of the inmate and the security interest
of the institution against the [media's] first amendment rights."
O'Brien stated that he would be reluctant to televise executions,
even if lethal injection were the method employed. Although televised executions are unlikely in his view, O'Brien favors the idea of
televising trials. He pointed out that although Illinois does not televise trials, Florida has done so successfully. O'Brien stated that
televising trials would give a larger segment of the population a
chance to see how the process works. In this way, people "would
see that it's not like on 'L.A. Law.'" According to O'Brien, this
would allow the public to make sure that judges and attorneys "are
behaving as they should." O'Brien is not sure whether the presence of cameras would affect the proceedings in any way, but conceded that considering "human nature," trials might be affected.
The prosecutors demonstrated a deep, personal commitment to
their office and the public. Madsen expressed one common sentiment when asked whether he had any final thoughts. "There was
an editorial, which said, 'What if the two victims in Walker's case
were two drug dealers instead of two young engaged kids? Would
society still put as much into the case and would they have gotten
the same results?' My approach to that hit home in a letter from
an aunt of Kelvin Parley, which I read to the parole board at the
clemency hearing on Walker. She asked the question I put to myself a lot, 'What if this were one of yours?' I ask myself, 'If what
happened to the victims of these families were to happen to my
daughter, would I be satisfied to let the system deal with it?' I am
working to make the answer to that question 'yes.' I am making
.sure that answer is 'yes,' not only for my daughter, but for all those
other victims out there."
B.

Defense Attorneys
Theresa Fehringer

The Journalinterviewed three capital defenders regarding their
views on the death penalty. Terri Mascherin is an associate with
Jenner and Block in Chicago. She first became involved in death
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penalty litigation when Dickie Gaines,' ° sentenced to death, wrote
to Albert Jenner to request assistance in filing his federal habeas
corpus petition. When the firm solicited volunteers, Mascherin responded and agreed to represent Gaines. Andrea Lyon spent fourteen years as a public defender and is currently the Director of the
Capital Resource Center, a branch of the Cook County Public Defender's Office. The Center draws funds from the state and federal
governments, and provides training for attorneys who represent
death row inmates at the postconviction and habeas stages. David
Bradford is the Director of the MacArthur Justice Center in Niles,
Illinois, a not-for-profit organization devoted to human rights and
civil rights causes. Chief among these causes is opposition to the
Illinois death penalty. The Center is purely a litigation organization and funded entirely from private sources. Bradford has handled death penalty litigation at every level of state and federal
courts, and has presented seminars and programs on death penalty
litigation.
The first question asked of the defenders was whether the death
penalty deters future crime. Mascherin stated that capital sentencing does not deter crime. If it did, Mascherin stated, such a deterrent effect would have reduced crime rates, a result not borne out
by statistics. She does not believe that the death penalty has any
redeeming qualities. Mascherin's problem with the death penalty
is both moral and ethical. It is a very sensitive thing, Mascherin
said, for society to set rules to regulate conduct that it considers
criminal and to impose capital punishment for the killing of another human being.
Lyon agreed that capital punishment does not deter crime. She
believes that if it has any effect at all, it increases crime. For example, Lyon stated that when Britain implemented public executions
at the turn of the century, the country experienced its highest
crime rate in history. She added that serious crimes "skyrocket[ed] during the period of executions." Lyon indicated that
jurisdictions retain the death penalty for a retributive purpose. She
does not support the retribution theory as a legitimate social justification. The only purpose that retribution serves, Lyon said, is to
make society more violent by freezing it in a position of anger,
which results in a perpetual cycle of violence.
Bradford also agreed that the death penalty fails to deter crime.
Bradford indicated that anecdotal evidence exists to support this
claim. He stated that several years ago, a prison guard in Florida
80.

See infra pages 40-51 for an interview with Dickie Gaines.
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came home after an execution and killed his wife the same day.
Additionally, Bradford said that a prison guard assigned to death
row in California committed a series of brutal rapes just after he
left his assignment on death row. In addition to these isolated instances of violence subsequent to an execution, empirical studies
support the conclusion that, at least in the short run, publicized
executions tend to increase violent crime.8 '
In discussing the theories behind capital punishment, Bradford
stated that the retributive theory is the only plausible explanation
for retaining the death penalty. Bradford sympathized with the
view that cold-blooded murderers deserve to die. Bradford added,
however, that society should do what is best for society, rather
than focusing on what an offender deserves. He pointed out that
an execution costs approximately two million dollars, whereas incarceration for natural life costs about four to five hundred thousand dollars. Bradford suggested that if government were to
dedicate the extra cost of executing an offender to more police,
more lights on the street, the prevention of child abuse, the prevention of drug abuse, and resources for the mentally retarded, communities would be safer.
Currently, seventy-five percent of Americans favor the imposition of the death penalty for capital crimes.82 Accordingly, the second question posed to the defenders was why Americans heavily
favor the death penalty. Mascherin believes that this statistic is the
result of the prevalent factor that crime plays in the lives of Americans. She added that the death penalty and crime are highly emotional issues; thus, the easiest way to respond is to say that society
ought to be hard on criminals instead of looking to the reasons
behind high crime rates. Both Mascherin and Bradford believe
that politicians embrace the death penalty to show voters that the
candidate is "tough on crime." Mascherin noted that individuals
who statistically are most likely to become subject to the death
penalty are those who are "disenfranchised," such as minorities
and the poor. Their opinions, said Mascherin, are not considered
in the political process.
Lyon believes that popular opinion strongly favors the death
penalty because capital punishment is a simple answer to a complex question. Lyon, along with Bradford, cited child abuse and
neglect, poverty, and racism as reasons for high national crime
81. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text discussing deterrent effect of the
death penalty.
82. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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rates. To solve the problem of crime, they believe that society
needs to look more to its causes than to severe sentences such as
the death penalty. Crime, said Lyon, is a symptom of an illness in
our country, and communities need to eradicate its causes.
Although she believes that some people are dangerous and should
be kept off the streets, her solutions deal with the problems that
cause large portions of our population to feel that this life holds
nothing for them. She added that programs directed toward solving these problems produce less visible results than newspaper reports about a recent execution.
Bradford believes that popular support for the death penalty is
high because citizens are asked, "Do you favor the death penalty?"
If the question were asked, "Do you favor the death penalty or life
imprisonment without parole?" Bradford believes that the percentage supporting the death penalty would be greatly reduced.
The third issue the defenders addressed was the role of race in
the capital punishment process. Mascherin believes that racism affects both the trial and the sentencing processes. She feels that race
bears primarily on the prosecutor's decision to seek a murder conviction and the death penalty.
Bradford reiterated Mascherin's views that race plays a significant role in whether the prosecution will opt for a capital sentence
and whether the jury will impose that sentence. Bradford stated
that a black defendant is much more likely to be sentenced to die
than a white defendant who committed the same crime under identical circumstances. Bradford noted that nationally, not one white
person who killed a black victim has been executed.83
Mascherin referred to the Gaines case as an example of possible
racism at work. In Gaines's first trial, an all-white jury convicted
him and sentenced him to death. Mascherin stated that by the
time Gaines had been awarded a new sentencing hearing, Batson v.
Kentucky 4 had been decided. As a result, the "Cook County
State's Attorneys Office had [to] let go of [its] time-honored practice of automatically excluding all blacks from the jury if the defendant was black." When Gaines was resentenced, the jury
included four blacks, and he did not receive the death penalty.
Mascherin knew for a fact that all of the black jury members voted
against death. Mascherin stated that based upon jury composition,
one could conclude that covert racism was at work in the original
Gaines sentencing.
83.
84.

See supra text accompanying note 54.
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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A further concern that plagues the criminal justice system, according to Mascherin, is competent representation of indigent defendants. This concern is especially great in capital cases due to
the severity of the sentence imposed. Mascherin opined that most
capital defendants do not receive adequate representation. She
cited scarce resources in public defenders' offices and inexperienced
attorneys as the chief reasons for this inadequacy. She added that
although public defenders do excellent work, their high case loads
make it difficult to dedicate adequate time to each case.
Lyon also believes that inadequate representation may create a
risk of error in capital cases. She surmised that eight out of ten
capital defendants suffer from poor representation. The most common error of counsel, Lyon stated, is poor preparation for the sentencing hearing. Many attorneys do not know how to prepare
properly for the sentencing hearing and most do not seek assistance, despite the fact that many agencies can assist attorneys in
preparing a capital case.
Bradford agreed with his fellow defense attorneys that capital
defendants generally receive inadequate counsel. He reported an
instance of counsel falling asleep during the course of the trial and
an example of a defense attorney referring to his client as a "nigger." Bradford added that in some jurisdictions, cases are appointed on a low-bid basis to the attorney who is willing to try the
case for the least amount of money. These attorneys often have
little experience or interest in providing adequate representation.
Bradford believes that a volunteer corps of attorneys cannot adequately meet the requirements of capital defendants. Both the lack
of financial incentive and disdain from colleagues or others in the
community discourage defenders. He believes, therefore, that a
more structured system is needed to provide adequate representation in the collateral stages after the public defender's role has been
completed.
All of the defenders spoke of the incredible amounts of time and
energy that must be devoted to prepare a capital defense. Mascherin described the two stages of a capital trial. In the first stage,
the defender develops a defense to guilt by investigating the actual
facts of the crime. During the sentencing stage, however, the emphasis shifts: the defender must present her client's life story in the
most favorable light possible. The attorney must reveal to the
court any available mitigating evidence. This should include the
defendant's entire background, relationships, psychological makeup, physical problems, and any other helpful information. Mas-
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cherin stated that this process requires tremendous devotion and
resources.
Mascherin stated that in a typical case, the sentencing hearing,
or "death trial," immediately follows the "guilt phase," and typically begins the next day. Mascherin believes that the capital sentencing hearing ought to last longer than the trial on guilt and
innocence. She commented that representing a capital defendant is
a huge undertaking for someone who is, for example, a sole practitioner appointed by the court.
Lyon agreed with Mascherin and focused her comments on the
sentencing process. In order to prepare adequately for the sentencing hearing, Lyon said, the defendant must tell his attorney things
that would more appropriately be addressed by a therapist. Additionally, the defendant must "expose himself to the jury in a way
that is just horrendous." The purpose of the sentencing hearing,
from defense counsel's perspective, is to show the jury why the
client should be spared a capital sentence. To achieve this objective, the attorney must expose everything that went wrong in the
defendant's life. The entire sentencing process, Lyon stated, puts
an incredible amount of pressure on the lawyer, the defendant, and
the defendant's family.
The Journal next asked the defenders to comment on the proposals for habeas reform. Recently, Congress and the American
Bar Association appointed committees to study capital punishment
procedural reform. These committees focused on reforming
habeas corpus and recommended limiting the number of appeals
available at the federal level.85
Lyon believes that a streamlined habeas procedure will severely
limit a defendant's right to an accurate result. She stressed that
such reform measures typify the political use of the death penalty.
"The death penalty is a political tool. That is all it is. That is all
it's ever been. It's a way of deflecting attention from the real
problems of this country." The public supports faster trials, Lyon
said, and politicians respond, without regard for fairness or quality
of representation. Lyon commented that when a politician loses
popularity, he or she invariably focuses on how crime in the streets
should be met with stronger death penalty laws. The death penalty
merely consumes resources that the government cannot spare.
Mascherin assertively stated that a streamlined habeas procedure would be a mistake. Although she recognizes the potential
85.

See supra text accompanying note 74.
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for abuse in the existing system, she added that cases arise in which
mitigating and exonerating evidence does not emerge until the
habeas process.
Mascherin offered the Cornelius Lewis case as an example of
how the postconviction process may reveal new evidence. Lewis
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At trial, defense
counsel incorrectly stipulated that Lewis had committed several
prior felonies. The defense attorney never investigated the prior
convictions. Lewis did not learn until his postconviction appeal
that the prosecution knew and failed to disclose that the defend86
ant's prior convictions were for misdemeanors, not felonies.
Mascherin commented that, similarly, a case could make it past
the federal habeas stage without such evidence being revealed.
Mascherin concluded, "Then what do you do? A defendant's certiorari petition is denied on habeas, and he discovers that the state
has some pieces of information that [it] has been withholding."
Accordingly, she firmly opposes reform that would limit a capital
defendant's opportunity to reveal error in the process.
Bradford likewise offered an example of a case in which grave
injustice would have occurred if error had not been discovered in
the latter stages of habeas review. In the Dickie Gaines case, 7 the
trial bailiff testified at the first sentencing hearing that Gaines had
attacked him. The bailiff claimed that Gaines said, "I'm going to
kill you white motherfucker." The bailiff also said that Gaines
tried to kill him with a hacksaw blade. The sentencing jury heard
this testimony. In the last stage of federal review, Bradford and
Mascherin investigated that incident because Gaines told them
that it never happened. Bradford stated that during the investigation, the bailiff admitted that he fabricated the entire incident at
the urging of the prosecutor. The bailiff admitted that he tried to
"pick a fight" with Gaines by racially slurring him. When Gaines
refused to fight, the bailiff agreed to fabricate the incident and testify in front of the jury. Bradford reported that the prosecutor specifically told the bailiff to use the phrase "white motherfucker"
because this would offend the young ladies on the jury and insure
that they would issue a death sentence. Bradford stated that
Gaines came very close to execution because of the bailiff's lies and
86. See People v. Lewis, 191 Ill. App. 3d 155, 547 N.E.2d 599 (1989), appeal denied,
131 I1. 2d 563, 553 N.E.2d 399 (1990).
87. Gaines v. Thieret, 846 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1988) (trial court's admission of hearsay, which implicated defendant as the triggerman in a multiple homicide, violated defendant's confrontation rights and was sufficiently harmful to justify reversal of death
sentence).
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that if habeas is streamlined, defendants may lose opportunities to
uncover errors.
Bradford feels that the federal habeas corpus process is absolutely critical to insure accuracy in enforcing the death penalty.
Habeas, said Bradford, protects defendants from execution based
on false evidence. It is the stage during which the courts can remedy grave injustice. Bradford believes that federal habeas in its
current form is inadequate because sufficient resources do not exist
to retain attorneys who can investigate and try these cases properly. Because the habeas reform measures currently being considered would expedite the habeas process, Bradford stated, innocent
people may be executed. He believes that the public will not accept
such injustice.
Lyon also voiced concern over the enormous risk of executing
innocent people, even under the current habeas procedures. She
believes that this risk is high because of the jury selection process.
Everyone who is against the death penalty, Lyon reported, is excluded from the jury for cause; everyone who waivers about it is
excused peremptorily by the prosecution. "This means you have
an authoritarian group of people who think that the police don't lie
...and that where there's smoke, there's fire .... The jur[ors]
ask[] themselves, 'How come he can't prove he didn't do it?'"
Lyon believes that juries chosen in this way have the potential to
render inaccurate verdicts which can cost the defendant his life.
Finally, the defenders were asked about capital punishment of
juveniles and the mentally disabled. Lyon commented that a capital sentence is an inappropriate response to crime and that it
should never be imposed upon a juvenile. Additionally, many capital defendants are retarded or otherwise mentally disadvantaged,
Lyon stated. Often, they do not understand the judicial process.
Lyon commented that in the past, she mishandled some clients until she began to learn about their disabilities. She explained that
some clients became hostile when she tried to explain an aspect of
their case to them. Initially, she responded with anger. She
learned, however, that her clients were confused about her explanations because the concepts involved were too abstract for them
to understand. They used hostility against their attorney, explained Lyon, to conceal their disabilities. Lyon believes that mentally retarded defendants are convicted at a higher rate because of
this two-sided inability to understand and communicate.
Bradford agreed and stated that "people who are at that early
stage of development or mentally retarded don't have the kind of
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capacity to make moral judgments that allow us to hold them accountable [by] taking their life for their conduct." Bradford believes that approximately twenty percent of the people on death
row are mentally retarded. He attributes this in part to their inability to deal with the system and make intelligent choices. Bradford added that the most disturbing aspect of sentencing mentally
retarded defendants to death occurs when the judge or jury has
absolutely no idea that the defendant is mentally retarded.
Bradford stated that if society could choose with complete accuracy the handful of people who committed the most horrible
crimes and could impose capital sentences upon only them, he
would not object to capital punishment. But, he added, history
proves that the system is incapable of ferreting out the handful of
cases in which all would agree that the death penalty is an appropriate response. Bradford stated that Americans execute two murderers for every thousand murders committed. We are choosing,
he said, those who are simply less able to defend themselves and
not those who have committed the most horrible crimes. "We
have wasted millions of dollars in an ineffective effort to try to find
those appropriate cases, and in the process, we've killed a number
of people who were innocent and a number of people who all of us
would agree did not deserve to die .... We really accomplished
absolutely nothing, other than perhaps to kid ourselves into thinking that we deterred some crime when we haven't."
Lyon is hopeful that the death penalty will be eliminated in the
future. She stated that this may happen because the efforts of capital defense attorneys are making death sentences too costly and
difficult to secure. Lyon speculated that one or two innocent people will be executed as a result of the shorter habeas process, and
two or three years later, evidence will emerge to prove their innocence. If that occurs, particularly to a white defendant, Lyon believes that the country may change its mind about the death
penalty.
In a closing comment, Bradford stated that the most substantial
common denominator among death row inmates is the severe
abuse that they suffered as children. Bradford stressed that his
comment was not made to engender sympathy or excuse the crimes
that death row inmates have committed. Bradford recounted,
however, the case of a little boy, Lettie McGee, who was hung
upside down in a closet by his parents every night and tortured.
The little boy suffered incredible abuse and cruelty. Eventually, he
died. Bob Greene, a Chicago Tribune columnist, pleaded for the
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death penalty for the parents. Bradford stated one couldn't help
but have a rush of anger and desire to hurt the parents. But what
was not considered, Bradford said, was the fact that the mother
had endured almost identical torture when she was a child. Bradford asked, "If that little boy, Lettie McGee, had survived that
closet and had grown up and had repeated to somebody else that
which had been done to him as a child, would we decide that he
should be executed?... In large measure, I think the people we're
executing are the Lettie McGees of the world and that strikes me
as just horribly wrong."
C.

Judges

Seth Kaberon
The Journalinterviewed trial court judges James M. Bailey and
Earl E. Strayhorn, former trial judge Louis B. Garippo, and former
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Seymour Simon.
Bailey has been a Cook County circuit judge for twenty-five
years, the last twenty in felony court. Previously, Bailey was an
assistant United States Attorney in the criminal division, an assistant corporation counsel for the City of Chicago, and was in private practice. As a judge, Bailey has presided over fifteen cases in
which death sentences were imposed and roughly thirtyfive other
cases in which death was a possible penalty. Bailey also teaches
courses at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, on how
to handle death cases.
Garippo served as a Cook County circuit judge from 1968 to
1980, all in felony court. He presided over five cases in which juries voted to impose death sentences, including that of John Wayne
Gacy. Prior to becoming ajudge, Garippo was an assistant Cook
County State's Attorney for ten and one-half years, including twoyear stints as criminal division chief and as first Assistant State's
Attorney. Garippo is now in private practice, with half of his work
in criminal defense.
Strayhorn has been a Cook County circuit judge for twenty
years, all in felony court. Previously, he spent eighteen years in
private practice and four years as an assistant Cook County State's
Attorney handling felony cases. Strayhorn presided over two cases
in which death sentences were imposed, both times by juries.
Simon was a member of the Illinois Supreme Court from 1980 to
1988. He previously served as an Illinois Appellate Court justice,
as president of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, and as a
Chicago alderman. Simon is currently in private practice.
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The judges were first asked about the unique aspects of death
penalty cases. Bailey said death cases are different because "they
are going to be looked over with a fine-tooth comb." Once a death
sentence is imposed in an Illinois court, the case is automatically
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, and a habeas corpus petition will be filed. "You know that fifty judges or so will review"
the case, some of whom "will be of a mind to overturn" the death
sentence, Bailey added. "You must make sure there is almost no
error in the record."
Strayhorn explained that "[b]ecause of the serious consequences,
the judge must be aware if there is any imbalance between the competency of the attorneys ....

The attorneys' performance is much

more critical." Having an overmatched defense attorney may cost
a defendant dearly, Strayhorn said. "Generally, what the court
must do is even out the playing field.... It's not a common problem.... If it doesn't happen but once, that's too much because of

the consequences."
Bailey similarly observed that judges must second-guess defense
attorneys, even though there is little judges can do to prevent
claims of ineffective assistance against defense attorneys or
prosecutorial misconduct. One step that Bailey takes is to ask defendants on the record whether they know and consent when their
attorneys waive their right to testify or other rights. Bailey
stressed the importance of making a record of the defendant's understanding of his counsel's work. "I ask the defendant if there is
anything the defendant wanted his attorney to do that he did not."
Judges also "must worry about the media" and keep jurors from
reading press accounts of trials, Bailey said. However, he added,
that is "no longer that big of a problem [in Chicago] because we've
had so many [capital cases]."
Death cases mean more work at every stage, including a greater
number of pretrial motions, Bailey said. Prosecutors are more
careful when trying death cases, while defense attorneys normally
are trying to put error in the record, he added. Garippo said that
defense attorneys are very careful to preserve any issue that might
be viable on appeal, postconviction, or habeas corpus review. "The
defense attorneys must be awake at night thinking of new issues to
interject."
Picking a jury usually takes longer in death cases, in part because each side has fourteen peremptory challenges, double the
number in other felony cases, Bailey said. There may also be a lot
of challenges for cause "if you don't handle it right." Once a juror
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finds a way to get dismissed there may be a "domino effect." Bailey said that he has eliminated this problem for the most part by
questioning jurors together rather than individually. He tells the
jury that they must follow the law and that the law provides for the
death penalty in certain circumstances. Then he asks whether any
jurors feel that they could not impose a death sentence under any
circumstances." Usually, two to five jurors say that they could not
and are excused. No defendant has objected to this voir dire procedure, Bailey said.
"I don't think most people are against the death penalty," Bailey
said. It's a subject, like abortion, on which some people have
strong opinions, while many others have no real opinion one way
or the other. Bailey added, "People who are against the death penalty will say so right away."
Although jurors in death cases face more extensive questioning,
Strayhorn said they "don't resent it as long as they understand the
process.... The court has to explain these things to the jury."
Nonetheless, despite the greater length and potential consequences
of death cases, they are "not that much different from other criminal cases," Strayhorn said. He does not approach death cases differently from other cases. As in other cases, the outcome is
determined by the evidence, Strayhorn said. "I don't have any
control over the evidence."
Garippo does not consider death penalty cases different from a
practical standpoint. "The fact that [I was presiding over] a death
penalty case made no difference. I felt I had to be careful in any
case. [I] realized the stakes were higher, but the care I felt was the
same." Garippo never introduced special procedures for handling
death penalty cases, except for dealing with the large crowds and
press contingent attending the Gacy trial.
Bailey and Garippo both felt that defense attorneys are under
the most pressure among participants in death penalty cases. Defense attorneys who handle a lot of these cases suffer "burn out,"
Bailey said. "It's a terrible feeling for a defense attorney to have
the ultimate defeat of having your client get the death penalty."
Defense attorneys, Bailey added, often second guess their trial
strategy for years afterward. "It lives with these people .... It's
very, very difficult."
"The defense attorneys are not only defending their clients,"
Garippo said. "They're defending themselves. The case will be in
88. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968) (allowing exclusion of
jurors who would refuse to impose a death sentence in any case).
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the system for years. Who knows how many attorneys will be assigned to review the original trial attorney's actions?"
Jurors also face greater stress in death cases. Bailey brings the
jurors into his chambers after each case. "After a death penalty
case, they'll be crying on the couch.... It's a tremendous responsibility," Bailey said. "It's amazing to me that you can even get
twelve people to agree on a case like that when they didn't even
know each other when the case began."
Strayhorn said jurors in capital cases must make "a real life and
death decision. ... That adds significantly to the pressure that they

have." He added, however, that "it's additional pressure all the
way up the line," affecting all participants. "The person who has
the easiest job in a death penalty case is the judge," Strayhorn explained, because the judge only has to preside. The jury bears the
burden of deciding the case, and the attorneys must conduct the
trial.
Jurors "go back and forth" and are not overly deferential to
prosecutors' death penalty requests, Bailey said. "I think it's very
difficult for [jurors] to impose [a death sentence], especially because
it has to be unanimous. It's asking a lot of them." Allowing death
sentences on a 10-2 vote might be better, Bailey said, but such a
provision would probably double the number of condemned prisoners in Illinois. He noted that Florida, with one of the largest
death row populations, allows the imposition of death sentences by
a majority vote. Bailey, however, "wouldn't take it away from the
jury ....

I'd rather have twelve persons considering it than one."

When a death sentence is imposed either by a judge or jury, he
added, "the facts are usually overwhelming," with a terrible crime
and a terrible prior record by the defendant. "Normally, it's a bad
guy and it's a bad crime." In Bailey's experience, there is no particular pattern to death sentences and no particular aspect that
tends to induce jurors to impose such sentences. Jurors "follow the
law. They focus on everything. They do a pretty good job."
In the Illinois Supreme Court, "death penalty cases [are] given
more attention, more care," Simon said. "I always took the view
that this [is] a special type of case," which requires a closer look at
the performance of defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges.
Other members of the court, however, feel that death penalty cases
should be treated the same as other criminal cases, Simon said.
Contrary to the adage that defendants are not entitled to a perfect
trial, only a fair trial, Simon believes "[wihen it comes to a death
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sentence, you're entitled to a perfect trial. . . . I would say that
most of the judges [on the high court do] not take that view."
Death sentence appeals are heard first in every new court term,
Simon said. "Everybody [justices, prosecutors, and defense attorneys] gear[s] up for death sentences." In conference, however,
death cases are put off until the court disposes of simpler, faster
cases. Simon added that the discussions in death cases are longer
and more detailed than in other cases.
After the Illinois death penalty statute was declared unconstitutional by U. S. District Judge Harold Baker in Silagy, and prior to
the Seventh Circuit's reversal,8 9 the Illinois Supreme Court declared in several cases that it did not consider itself bound by the
rulings of the federal district or circuit courts, Simon noted.9° "I
... recognize[d] their authority" because the federal district and
circuit courts can issue writs of habeas corpus and can overturn
state convictions and sentences. Simon added that he tried to
avoid ruling in conflict with federal precedents, but he conceded
that this was a minority view on Illinois' high court.
Asked about their personal views on the death penalty, the trial
judges generally accepted the penalty with reservations. "I've
never been a great fan of the death penalty," Garippo said. "I've
never been opposed to it, though. In the proper case, I would impose it ....
I was never satisfied it was the right thing to do."
Strayhorn said, "The death penalty is being imposed for the
wrong reasons." It is ostensibly for deterrence, even though it "has
never been a deterrent in the history of man," Strayhorn explained.
"But it's for punishment, not deterrence." Some crimes, he said,
are so severe that the public sees no adequate punishment short of
death-an "eye-for-an-eye" approach. Viewing the death penalty
in this manner, as a public demand, solves a moral dilemma for
Strayhorn. "Morally, I have a problem with rendering a God-like
verdict, deciding who should live and who should die.... I think
the judgment of death should be imposed by a higher being....
But as a judge sworn to uphold the law, I must impose death in the
proper circumstances." He added that he had no second thoughts
89. United States ex rel. Silagy v. Peters, 713 F. Supp. 1246 (C.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd,
905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1024 (1991).
90. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 349-50, 544 N.E.2d 330, 344 (1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3294, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 17 (1990); People v. Del Vecchio,
129 Ill. 2d 265, 296, 544 N.E.2d 312, 327 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1540 (1990);
People v. Brisbon, 129 Ill. 2d 200, 224, 544 N.E.2d 297, 308 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1796 (1990).
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about the two cases that he presided over in which death sentences
were imposed because the circumstances were appropriate in each.
For Bailey, death cases "felt different at the beginning. But after
you've tried a few of them, you just do it." He said he has no
personal qualms about imposing death sentences, but those judges
who do should seek transfers to other court divisions. Bailey said
that one criminal court judge quietly asked not to be assigned any
death cases and was accommodated. Other judges have sought
transfers, added Bailey, but none have said that it was based on
their feelings about capital punishment.
Bailey said that he is often asked whether he believes the death
penalty is a deterrent, but that "is not an issue for a judge. It's up
to the legislature ....

I think courts interfere too much, particu-

larly reviewing courts."
Simon, an outspoken opponent of the death penalty, said that
his "biggest objection ... is that it's impossible to apply it evenly."

Uniformity is difficult in most types of cases; leaving death
sentences to juries exacerbates the problem, Simon said. Judges
are better equipped than juries to conduct sentencings, he added,
but judges will also differ. "This is not a good way to determine
life and death.... We can tolerate lack of uniformity in other cases

because it's the best we can do. But we need better in death cases."
When asked about delays in executions, Simon said, "People
wonder why it takes so long. Courts are very careful in death penalty cases, and that's the way it should be." He does not believe
that this creates a bad public impression of the courts. There are
about 2000 persons currently on death row nationally, and Simon
predicted that eliminating that backlog within a year would create
a massive public outcry. "There's no way that the people of this
country are going to stand for six executions a day." Simon believes that eventually "the death penalty will fall," perhaps as a
result of public revulsion over summary executions in places like
Iran and Iraq.
The trial judges, however, feel that long delays in executions
have undermined the courts' public standing. Garippo said that
the imposition of death sentences creates "a false public impression
that we have a death penalty ....

We're fooling the public ...

Our

system is not geared for enforcing the death penalty. It probably
never will be."
"Courts of review should rule. That's the big thing," Garippo
said. In John Wayne Gacy's case, Garippo said that he ordered
immediate preparation of the trial transcript, but it still took over a
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year for the defense to file its first appellate brief. According to
Garippo, appellate courts should push the matter and rule quickly.
Trial judges face many more issues and decide them in a fraction of
the time that appellate judges take, he observed.
As a result of long delays and lack of executions, Strayhorn said,
"the punishment becomes less certain." This creates a public perception problem, but, he added, "you want to make sure this is the
right person. ...

[Y]ou have a dilemma."

The public perceives a problem when the penalty is on the books
but no executions occur, Bailey said. Dickie Gaines was on death
row for ten years before his sentence was vacated. 9 ' At a new sentencing hearing before Bailey, the jury decided against death. Bailey said that afterward, some of the jurors felt that Gaines would
never be executed "so why fool around with this? What's the sense
of the death penalty when it's not being carried out?"
D. Prisoners
92
William E. Meyer, Jr.

A difficult part of this project was to obtain the view from the
other side-the view of the people actually sentenced to death. No
current death row inmates were interviewed due to lawyers' concerns that publication might hurt their clients' cases. The Journal
did, however, interview two former death row inmates. One of
them, Dickie Gaines, now serves a natural life sentence in Illinois.
The other, Gary McGivern, from New York, is free. The interviews are presented here in question and answer format to preserve
to the greatest extent possible the opinions of the two men
interviewed.
1. Dickie Gaines
Dickie Gaines was sentenced to death on November 11, 1979, at
the age of twenty, for a double murder. The Seventh Circuit subsequently overturned his death sentence. 93 Gaines was later resentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He had
spent more than eight years on the death rows of the Menard and
Stateville Correctional Centers. The Journal interviewed Gaines
91. Gaines v. Thieret, 846 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1988) (state ordered-to retry, resentence
to a term of years, or release Gaines).
92. Melissa Widen, a student at the University of Maryland School of Law, assisted
in the Gaines interview.
93. Gaines v. Thieret, 846 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1988).
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on August 10, 1990, at Pontiac Correctional Center, where he is
currently in disciplinary segregation.
When did you first know that the death penalty was a possibility
in your trial?
I first knew it was a possibility when I was convicted. Then the
state started talking about the death penalty. They were talking
about aggravation and mitigation, and I didn't know what mitigation meant.
What went through your mind when the jury handed down the
sentence?
Well, the jury voted to impose the death penalty. I was so young
that it didn't really affect me because I didn't appreciate the severity of the situation. If a person is older and mentally mature, he'd
see it was a really serious situation.
At that particular time, I was told I was going to get a new trial.
That played a role in me not looking at it from a serious standpoint. But as time went on, I realized this was a serious situation.
What was the reaction of your family?
Well, I didn't really know the extent of how they really felt. I
know my mother was shocked by it. As for the rest of my family, I
didn't have much contact.
Were many family members in court?
My aunt came once, but that was it. And my mom was there.
What was your first day on death row like?
Well, at Stateville, the time frame was that I was real young. A
lot of things didn't really register with me. I felt just like I was put
in prison. I wasn't looking at the death penalty aspect of it, banking on what the attorney said. The night I went to Stateville, the
captain told me that "there ain't gonna be no takeovers 'cause I'm
here now." He looked at me and said, "We'll put him in with the
radicals." Approximately eleven men were on death row at
Stateville.
Describe death row.
It consisted of four galleries. You have upper west and lower
west, upper east and lower east. Each gallery contained between
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nine and ten cells. Each cell was somewhere probably sixty square
feet, could'a been six by twelve, maybe a little more.
How many hours did you spend in the cell?
You came out, when I first got there, I got out once a day, three,
sometimes four hours. For me, that lasted about forty days. Then
I got a disciplinary report. They put me on segregation status. I
spent eleven months at Stateville.
When I arrived at Menard, six guys went down. They had you
handcuffed side by side with a chain through the middle. After we
arrived at Menard, the warden, James Buck, gave us a talk. He
said that "you guys is at Menard now. We going to treat you like
men if you want to be men. We'll treat you like dogs if you want to
be dogs, and we're good at treating men like dogs." When I heard
that, I knew I was going to be in trouble. Then they put us in the
cells.
They had a lot of rules, repressive in my eyesight. You weren't
allowed to buy no soap, deodorant, food in a can, not allowed to
buy no coffee or sugar. They had a rule after eight o'clock: if you
talked you had a disciplinary report. There was a lot of things
done along racial lines. The rules was the same for black and
white, but they applied them differently. Say it's nine o'clock and
me and Perry Cobb [a black formerly on death row] is talking.
The guard will write up a ticket. But not if two white guys was
talking. I just decided I was going to have to challenge this, so as a
collective body of people we submitted written grievances. But basically, the administration totally disregarded the written
grievances.
Prior to going to Menard, the ACLU had challenged to try to
stop transfers from Stateville to Menard. The director made the
statement that Menard would be more secure and better with a
typewriter and a library. I came there June 19, 1980. There was
no yard. The library had nothing about no criminal law. It was on
real estate and probate. There was one typewriter. That was it. So
it led me to doing other things.
What did the officers do that you didn't like?
They'd make kinda' racial slurs. One day, an officer, Bouchard,
he and a guy named Yates was having some words. The officer
said, "all you niggers." At this point, it became a loud uproar.
Guys was entertaining the thought of doing something to this guy.
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Because of the outrage his superiors talked to him and he apologized to everybody. But I know it was just a front.
What was done to the food?
The guards would tamper with the food. For example, it was a
common practice for the guards to play with each other in a homosexual sense in front of the prisoners, grabbing each others' buttocks and genitals. Then they'd serve the food. A lot of guards
would come to work, you'd see dirt under their fingernails, then
they'd serve the food. It was unsanitary. I had experiences like
cigarette ashes, butts, and hair put in my food. I seen them spit in
peoples' food.
What were the cells like at Menard?
When I got to Menard, my segregation time was wiped clear.
But in my eight years at Menard, I accumulated thirty years of
segregation time. The cells was six feet in width and nine feet in
length, and the height was eleven feet. But they was small. The
width might have been less than six feet. You could open your
arms and touch wall to wall. You had a bed, a toilet, and a sink,
and a fluorescent lamp as a light.
Did you then have much contact with your family?
Throughout my stay on death row, my contact with family
wasn't frequent, except for my sister Kathy. Periodically I would
write. Other than that it was with my sister, most by mail.
My family visited about, my mother about three or four times,
my sister maybe about five times, over a period of eight years.
How far was it to travel?
About 360 miles. They'd take the bus.
It is a fact that many people who get on death row eventually get
off of it without being executed. Do you think there was any
focus at all on rehabilitation?
No. In terms of the prison administration providing programs,
absolutely not.
How did the experience affect you emotionally?
My attitude varied from time to time. In light of the way the
prison administration was managing death row, the environment
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was so oppressive and things were done along racial lines that I
took a radical attitude, didn't put much focus on the death sentence. As time went on, I kinda' felt that it was a hopeless
situation.
Later, as my case started to get affirmed, I started to get depressed. At one point, I did decide not to appeal any further. I
didn't change my mind. The court said I couldn't do it. The court
sent me a "motion denied" when I filed a motion to stop appeals.
What I did was I had a cert. petition to the Illinois Supreme
Court. I had to write to the U. S. Supreme Court to dismiss the
cert. and wrote the Illinois Supreme Court to carry out the sentence-this is the punishment I was supposed to have, so do it.
They sent me an order back. They didn't want to do it.
How did you see it affect others?
I don't know of anybody on death row that the sentence doesn't
affect in some way. People might try to put up a barrier, but deep
down inside a person be hurting. Like, I know another guy who
came to the point where he felt his whole situation was hopeless,
had family problems. He asked to abandon his case. I tried to
convince him not to do it, that he'd have to condition himself to
deal with it. As time went on he came around.
What ways did otherpeople react, or how did they deal with the
sentence?
Most people, when they had a sense of hopelessness, it stems
from some type of family situation. If a guy is married and his wife
wants to divorce him, a lot of guys may say there ain't nothing to
live for. A guy was talking about hanging himself. Perry Cobb
talked him out of it. Most situations involve family problems.
If you're on death row and you got good family ties and people
stand beside you, it's strength. If you don't have it or lose it, it has
an affect.
How did you cope with the experience?
What I used to do is to keep myself occupied, such as I started
studying different areas of the law, helping guys with different legal
matters. Guys who couldn't write, I helped them, did a lot of reading. That's basically how I dealt with most of the oppressive and
mad environment at Menard. It's like, for instance, at Menard,
when a guy came from Menard up here to Pontiac, it be like they
be happy. It's just designed to drive a person insane.
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How did others cope with the experience?
I seen guys cut their wrists, like a suicide thing. A guy overdosed. I mean, there's different things that affect different people.
It's kinda' hard to say what makes people do things. It's, at
Menard, the stuff, the way they run the prison, it makes a person
want to feel of taking his own life, especially if you have no support. You need emotional support. The environment is so oppressive, it makes a person want to kill or take their own life.
I seen situations where a correction captain went in a guy's cell,
picked him up, and threw him up against the wall. The other guy
got the experimental drugs, like psychotic drugs, given to him
against his will. They'd restrain him and shoot him up, only when
he'd start acting up. I've seen guys get up at three a.m. and start
calling their wife, all kind of things.
Did you ever seriously think you'd be executed?
Well, I put it this way. When I started, it was after the circuit
court had denied postconviction, then I started taking a serious
outlook about this situation and the penalty. I know I was in
trouble, had to get a new attorney. I knew that I'd be in for it if I
kept my attorney. I just knew if I didn't get rid of this guy, they'd
succeed in getting me, I mean the good old State of Illinois.
What is your opinion of state-sanctioneddeath?
First of all, I think there should not be no death penalty. It does
not serve a deterrent purpose. It's been fourteen years since it's
been restored in America. If you get homicide statistics, you'll see
it hasn't deterred the homicide rate. It just deters the particular
person if the state succeeds in executing. Death penalty breeds violence. You have this violent type of penalty, so this is what you
get: violence. There is a political and social will to maintain the
death penalty statute in America, probably because every time
something happens, politicians get to screaming, convince the people that this is the answer. I believe society is still protected with
resort to natural life or a certain amount of years without parole. I
also see the death penalty as a political tool to advance political
careers. They know that when the media prints something about a
case with notoriety to it, a brutal homicide, media blows it up,
media calls for the imposition of the death penalty. What I see is
that politicians is using it to attract votes. The governor's race in
Texas this year, [the candidates ran] ads bragging about how many
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people they killed. It works because most of the people in society
is in favor of capital punishment.
The court is supposed to be a body to objectively review something without bowing to political and social pressure. A lot of decisions, especially out of the United States Supreme Court,
decisions reflect an attitude that most people is for capital punishment, so it's not cruel and unusual punishment. So I think the
U.S. Supreme Court is sending a message to the lower federal
courts and the state courts to "let's get the show on the road.
These guys got all the justice they got coming."
What is your opinion of those in the legal community and the
community at large who would shorten the appeals process?
Again, it goes back to the United States Supreme Court decision
in Teague v. Lane,94 which prevents a person from benefitting from
a new rule of constitutional law when he's beyond direct appeal. It
reduces federal habeas corpus to a procedural formality you go
through, where people used to rely on relief in federal court. The
Supreme Court is telling the lower federal courts that we're returning the power to the states. There are barriers being erected to
further make it hard to obtain relief at the federal level. An example of that is where the Supreme Court has granted cert. in the
McCleskey9" case, regarding successive habeas corpus petitions.
When a person looks at the decision in Teague, and the procedural
default doctrine, you is in a bad position. When you read these
two cases and pull them together, you better follow the rules at the
state level or you're in trouble. An example of the United States
Supreme Court getting the show on the road is the Powell Commission, expediting the appellate process in capital cases.
Also, I just think that all of the law relating to the death penalty
reflects to me what I call hypocrisy to a certain point. For instance, Penry v. Lynaugh,96 a Texas case, the Court found no bar
on execution of a mentally retarded person. If you're mentally retarded, how can someone say you're in control committing a
crime? It illustrates a disregard for human life. Period. By the
Court. But by no means am I saying that, granted most people in
death row have committed atrocious crimes, but you have all types
of laws protecting society without resorting to the death penalty,
like natural life or twenty years before parole.
94.

489 U.S. 288 (1989).

95.
96.

McCleskey v. Zant, 110 S. Ct. 2585 (1990).
109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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In Stanford v. Kentucky,97 about a sixteen to seventeen year old,
how can you speak about morality and civilization in one breath
and apply the death penalty to a sixteen or seventeen year old?
You want to deal with these people as adults, but not in other areas
of life. If you sixteen years old, society won't sell you no liquor or
vote, but want to deal with me and impose the ultimate penalty on
me. These people isn't mature enough. A lot aren't fully developed mentally yet. Plus, at that age, there's a chance that a person
can turn their life around, as opposed to a thirty year old with a
twelve to thirteen year criminal history.
How old were you when you were convicted?
I was 20.
What are your feelings about Charles Walker, who refused to
appealfurther because he could not face the prospect of life with
no parole?
I look at Charles Walker from a human standpoint. I see everybody on death row, human beings who went astray in life. In regards to him telling them to carry out that sentence, personally I
tried, had a female friend who is an opponent of capital punishment to write him a letter not to persist in that course. He didn't
want to do that, but continued on.
What I think is two-fold. Number one, a man's gotta' do what a
man's gotta' do. Number two is that I think that it's going to
cause a lot of, if the execution is carried out, 98 a lot of concern for
guys on death row. People are going to become a lot more nervous, on brink of contemplating suicide. It could precipitate a lot
of things. I have never talked to Charles Walker personally about
that situation, so I don't know the real reason why he wants to do
it. I don't really think he should do it, but I don't have no control.
What is your opinion of the public interest groups against the
death penalty? Are they effective? How much are they allowed to
help the inmates?
To some extent, the Coalition Against the Death Penalty is positive because they visit each death row in Illinois once every other
month. Even that in itself-just to see somebody come from the
97. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
98. Walker was executed on September 12, 1990, one month after the Journalinterviewed Gaines.
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outside-is a positive aspect. You ain't looking at the green suit
everyday.9 9 It has a positive uplift. The Coalition helps guys to get
pen pals, typewriters. But the Coalition doesn't appreciate the significance of pen pals. If you know somebody on the outside, it
strengthens you. If you're abandoned, it's a whole lot of weight on
your shoulders.
The Coalition is a good group. But it could be a better group.
I'm in the process of attracting more people to oppose the death
penalty. But I believe that a lot of people say, about Charles
Walker wanting to forgo his appeal, "It will open up the floodgates." I don't necessarily believe that.
The death penalty been in existence since 1977. So far the state
hasn't been successful."°° A lot of guys, their appeals are winding
down now. When you look at the support for capital punishment,
whether Charles Walker forgoes or not, there are going to be executions in Illinois. It's just a matter of time. If Charles Walker
wasn't forgoing his appeal, it might be two to three years down the
road. But it's going to happen. I do not foresee capital punishment being abandoned for a long time, as long as you have brutal
murder, child killings, etc. It's going to be that.
What is your point of view on televised executions?
The only way televised executions would make people reject the
death penalty is if there was a significant decline in the number of
homicides that take place. You see child killing, way out stuff.
There is going to have to be a decline in brutal murders or murders
period.
Would it deter murder?
No. I see capital punishment in a capitalistic society as being
interrelated. Everybody likes to have nice things in life. Some people don't want to work for these things. Some people don't feel
they have a stake, so they take what they want. Most people under
the death penalty have committed a crime for monetary gain. So a
capitalistic society breeds greed. Everybody tries to climb up the
ladder, so it's interrelated.
99. Illinois prison guards wear green uniforms.
100. One month later, however, on September 12, 1990, Charles Walker was
executed.
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What would be your preference of the method if you had to face
it?
If I had to be executed, that is a tough question. I think that I'd
opt for the lethal injection. I would have to opt for the lethal
injection.
Do you think prosecutors get out of line in these cases?
By all means. First of all, all lawyers, particularly defense attorneys and prosecutors, they know the ground rules, they know
proper comment, and arguments is supposed to be based on evidence at trial. When they get up and call guys "mutants from
hell," I think things like that prejudice the guy on trial and help get
a conviction. It appeals to the emotions of jurors. Jurors are fed
up when they hear the word "crime." It turns them off then and
there. I see in a lot of cases that the prosecution does the wrong
thing seeking the death penalty. I knew a guy on death row at
Menard, seventeen to nineteen years old at the time, his crime consists of murder and robbery. Let's say that you have John Doe
with murder where a man got shot, not brutal. I ain't trying to
denigrate a person's life. But if you just shoot, the court may look
at it less than if you decapitate somebody. Let's say a guy has
murder, armed robbery, no background, and he's nineteen to
twenty, and let's take a guy with a fifteen year background with a
murder, armed robbery, and rape, and prosecutor seeks the death
penalty against him, but not the other guy. It's not right. But of
course, these things happen.
What motivates the prosecution to ask for the death penalty?
Race factors come in. In certain cases, the publicity plays a factor. For instance, publicity in a case, along with the victim's status, plays a role too. What jury won't convict somebody for
murdering and raping a doctor's wife?
I believe that Charles Walker is hell-bent on going that direction. Nothing will change his mind at this point. I do know from
my correspondence with other guys on death row in Menard, they
don't like what he's doing, they feel it will affect them in terms of
their cases and in other ways. I hate to say this, but on the other
hand, if Charles Walker goes through with what he's doing, it will
give a whole new perspective to people and death row, especially at
Menard. Even though most people may not show that they feel the
effects, inwards they be hurting. But a lot of people act as if they
don't take the situation seriously. If you took it seriously, you
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would be involved in your case extensively to save your own life.
That wasn't the case with most people at Menard. If Charles
Walker goes through with the thing, attitudes will change.
Do they let you go to the library?
No. I have a miniature library in my cell. Then, if it's cases that
I want, and I'm on a case with a citation, the law clerks can copy
the case for me. But as far as in-depth research, I can't do it. You
can't borrow no books in segregation or in the population. You
have to pay for photocopying. Or they rent the photocopies out or
charge you five cents for every case.
At Menard, they compelled me to do a lot of things that had
adverse effects on me. I slept on a slab of steel with no mattress for
two years, then they blame me for it. One other thing I'd like to
say, about the lawyers, but I think that a lot of lawyers, particularly at the trial level, if appointed by the court, should take these
capital cases a lot more seriously, because courts are imposing the
waiver doctrine. Lawyers shouldn't accept the case without making a strong effort. Later on, what happens is that if the new attorneys come on the case, they have to raise issues extracted from the
transcript and clean up the things the other attorney didn't do.
Does it help to have an incompetent lawyer at trial, so that a lot
of errors are preservedfor appeal or so you can argue inadequate
representation?
It depends on the type of case. If the evidence is overwhelming,
I'll take the incompetent lawyer at trial. It's just a natural thing.
If a guy knows they got the goods on him, he wants an incompetent lawyer. A lot of guys be thinking that the people sitting on
benches is stupid. They don't see the strategy. But that very question is why the courts have tightened up in areas. It makes it
harder to show ineffective assistance of counsel. You need to meet
two prongs in Strickland v. Washington.10
Death row is a lot more pressure, particularly when a person
starts using up all their appeals. I believe that if the Supreme
Court is telling the federal courts to tighten up, return power to the
state courts, what I think is that guys on death row have to obtain
relief at state level. I foresee the Seventh Circuit becoming like the
Fifth Circuit. It's hard to obtain relief in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits. I see danger ahead. Fortunately, my case just happened
101.

466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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to be one of the first in federal court in Illinois. When the circuit
court denied my postconviction, I went on a letter-writing campaign to get attorneys for my federal habeas corpus. I seen the
situation as more serious. I do that for guys now. But it's kinda'
hard to get an attorney. It's not a very popular cause representing
somebody on death row, unless it's a case where the guys can really
show that there's a factual innocence thing. How many attorneys
would take a John Gacy or Ted Bundy-with a lot of notoriety?
Let's be realistic.
2.

Gary McGivern

In 1970, two years before the Supreme Court's decision in
Furman v. Georgia,10 2 Gary McGivern was convicted of murder in
New York and sentenced to death. That sentence was later reversed, however, and on retrial McGivern was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-five years to life. At all times, his guilt was at
issue, and according to McGivern, the prosecutor hid important
evidence, which later disappeared prior to his last trial. Governor
Mario Cuomo granted him clemency-not a pardon-and he was
paroled last year after twenty-two years behind bars, several of
them on death row. He spoke with the Journalon August 6, 1990.
Please give us your background, about how this all came about.
I was born and raised in the Bronx, in an Irish community.
When I was twenty-one, I was arrested for a robbery. At that
time, my arrest was a service to the community. I went to prison,
where I was coming to terms with my antisocial behavior and the
crime I had committed.
While I was serving the sentence. I was accused of attempting to
escape and, in the course of that escape, shooting a deputy sheriff.
There was two deputy sheriffs involved, and there was three inmates. We were in the Auburn prison and we were travelling from
the Auburn prison in upstate New York to a court hearing in
Westchester County in White Plains. During that drive from Auburn prison to White Plains, one inmate, a guy named Robert
Bowerman, attempted to escape, snatched a pistol, shot the deputy
sheriff. He got shot himself. He died. I got shot. My codefendant
got shot in the back of the head, and there was one surviving deputy sheriff. That happened in September 1968.
The legal history goes from '68 all the way up to last year, until
102.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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March of last year, when I was released from prison. At the trial,
they accused me of doing the shooting, and the first trial commenced in September of 1969 and resulted in a hung jury. It was a
case where the deputy sheriff got on the stand, testified that he seen
me doing the shooting, and it wound up in a hung jury. So his
credibility was not good for the jury to come in with a hung jury. I
was tried six months later, convicted. I fired my attorney at the
penalty phase of the trial and represented myself. I was convicted
and sentenced to die.
I went to death row in February of 1971, and I stayed there until
1973, when my case was unanimously reversed by the New York
State Court of Appeals.... A new trial was ordered. I went back
to Ulster County, which is where I was tried. The new trial started
the end of 1974. They offered me a plea. If I would have pleaded
guilty, I would have been immediately eligible for release. I refused to take the plea, and I went to trial.
During the penalty phase of the second trial, I had represented
myself and I saw a box of evidence that wasn't in my box, but
which was in the prosecutor's box. The evidence was a picture of
Bowerman on the morgue table, the belt he was wearing. A security belt was on, and it was cut on the right-hand side. The prosecutor's theory was that I participated in the crime and I cut
Bowerman's belt. But if I was sitting in the middle of the car, the
belt would have to have been cut on the left-hand side. Which side
the belt was cut on was a very important piece of evidence. So I
discovered this evidence that showed I couldn't have cut the belt,
which blew his whole theory. The belt was used in the appeal, and
I got a reversal. So when I went down for the third trial armed
with this piece of evidence,... I was convicted again. The piece of
evidence I had mentioned before disappeared, and I was convicted.
At what point in these proceedings did you know that the
prosecutor was going to seek the death penalty for you?
The death penalty at that time was still in effect in New York. I
was on death row when Furman v. Georgia came down. In the
second trial, I was convicted and they pushed for the death penalty. Once the news media caught hold, the issue there was no
longer guilt or innocence; it was the image of law enforcement.
The crime had been committed. They wanted somebody to pay. It
wasn't good enough that the guy who actually snatched the gun
was killed ....
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What was death row like to you?
It was a horror. It's a prison within a prison, and they have no
rules. They can do anything they want. There was times when I
used to go to sleep at night, and they'd go in the back in the catwalk and take a bat and bang it and wake me up. I'd wake up and
then get back to sleep and they'd bang it again when I went back to
sleep.
Do you think the death penalty deters crime?
Absolutely not. It has no proven deterrent value. In my opinion, it's purely a symbol. It's a symbol that there's a need for it. It
seems like politicians are required to give citizens an answer, a solution to crime. Rather than bring in the long-term solutions, the
real solutions, like education and employment and combatting racism, they say, "well, we'll give you the death penalty and that will
solve the crime problem." It's terrible. It's terrible that they're
even selling it. And it's worse yet that the American people are
buying it. It's like so clear.
I spent twenty-two years in prison. The people that I did time
with were not the sons of lawyers and doctors. These were people
who didn't know who their fathers were, who came from broken
homes, drug addicts, with mothers with alcohol problems, and
those are the people who populate prisons in this country and the
death rows.
What did you see death row do to these people? Did you see
changes in them, for better orfor worse?
Death row, and capital punishment as an institution, worsened
people. It brought out the worst in the guards. It was an unpleasant experience. It was a horrifying experience. I think it demeans
everybody. With me, personally, I was forced to make a choice
whether I would buy into this message that was being sent to me,
or would I struggle against it. I obviously struggled against it.
How did your family react when you were sentenced?
Mortified. They were horrified. It was devastating. How they
survived it is beyond me. But they did, and it's because I had a
good family I was able to go through twenty-two years of prison
experience and come out the other side undamaged.
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What is your opinion as a lay person as to whether the death
penalty is constitutional?
The death penalty is obviously constitutional. The United States
Supreme Court said it's constitutional. That's a legal reality.
There was a time when the United States Supreme Court said slavery was constitutional too, so whether it's constitutional or not is
not really the issue. It's a legal reality. They've said, "yes, it's
constitutional," and they go on to say that most of the people in
this country want capital punishment. But most of the people in
this country wanted slavery too at one point, so that isn't something that impresses me as an important factor in whether we as a
society should embrace capital punishment.
I think it's a short-term kind of solution to a long-term problem.
It's just giving people something because they don't want to look
like they can't do anything about the problems. And that's just the
nature of our system. You know, people get elected every two
years and four years, and they have to have answers. They have to
answer the public, give some kind of solution to these very legitimate problems. Crime is a legitimate problem. People are scared
and nervous and frightened, and victims have a right to be outraged and so does the community. But I think it's dangerous to
focus in on the emotional and the immediate. You have to see
crime in the broader context. Who or what makes up the criminal
population in this country and why? That's where you find the
solution. You don't find it in saying, "look at this hideous crime
that was committed." It obviously was committed by someone
who felt alienated from our society. And usually, it's the throwaways from our society who end up in the prison system or on
death row.
Do you think there are innocent people on death row and that
mistakes have been made and innocent people have been
executed?
It's a fact, . . . but I think innocence is another limited issue.
You know blacks are more likely to be executed if the victims are
white, and that says something about racism in our country. And
until we can take care of all the other social ills-the racism, the
lack of employment, education-I think we should put the death
penalty on the side until the problems in our society are responded
to. I don't think we have the right to use such a grave and serious
and absolute penalty when we can't be sure what the real reasons
are. And that's why I'm frustrated.... The legal community has
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this way of really taking an issue and keeping it in a box. They
don't want it to get out. This person committed the crime, therefore, the penalty must be death and let's get on with it. I want to
see why this guy committed the crime or why this woman committed the crime. People are not just born evil.
I think what happens is that in our interaction with society as we
grow and learn, we're either nourished or damaged. It's sometimes
people are damaged in a fast-moving society, and it's important to
see criminal behavior in the context of the whole society. I'm really disturbed and frustrated by the limited point of view that the
legal community has. And I think it does everybody a disservice.
If we're really concerned with solutions, we have to look at the
broader context.
What is your life like now that you are out of prison?
It's a mixture; it's a range. There's joys and there's pain.
There's sadness and there's celebration. But the consistent thread
is struggle. The struggle has been a long struggle... Now I find
myself at the age of forty-five looking for a career. That's a little
scary. I can't compete in the construction trades because there's a
lot of younger people out there, and it just keeps me on edge a little
bit. And I'd like to do writing, but I have to pay bills at the same
time. So life is just a mixture. It's a challenge, but the bottom line
is good. I live in a good community and I have a good family, and
that's fortunate.
E. Public Interest Groups
William E. Meyer, Jr. and PatriciaS. Spratt
Public interest groups play a visible role in the death penalty
controversy. One such group, the Illinois Coalition Against the
Death Penalty, formed in 1976 to head off then-pending death penalty legislation. Since the Illinois statute went into effect in 1977,
the Coalition has worked both to abolish the death penalty and to
narrow its scope. Additionally, it provides support for death row
inmates and their families. The Coalition draws funding from private donations and grants, and uses office space donated by the
ACLU.
The Journal interviewed Pat Vader, director of the Coalition.
After raising her children, Vader went back to college at the age of
forty to pursue a degree in criminal justice. She became interested
in the Coalition through a student internship. That internship
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eventually led to her heading the Coalition. She says that the Coalition "gives me what I think I need at this stage of my life-an
opportunity to really work on something that I think is important." When asked why the Coalition opposes the death penalty,
Vader offered several reasons beyond the Coalition's basic moral
and ethical grounds of opposition. First, she stated that the penalty is a racially discriminatory punishment that does not deter potential murderers. In fact, Vader said, "studies show that it does
the exact opposite. It keeps the violence going ....

It has such a

brutalizing effect on society that it's almost like a quick fix, and
people believe in it as such and the state is doing it, so why
shouldn't I?" Further, Vader pointed to the "copy-cat syndrome,"
when a person gets publicity by emulating the violent behavior of
another. "[The death penalty is] a violent thing, and it has a violent effect on society," she stated.
Additionally, the Coalition opposes the death penalty because
innocent people get executed. Vader said, "We've had people in
Illinois °3 .

.

. who were released from the system after nine years,

three of them spent on death row. Five trials. They were found to
be innocent at their fifth trial. So there's a lot to the possibility that
we may be executing innocent people."
When all of these factors come together, she sees no legitimate
reason for capital punishment. "It really does nothing but make us
think that it's doing something to stop crime," she stated, "and it's
not doing that." Vader mentioned that although it takes far more
tax dollars to execute someone than it does to keep him in prison
for the rest of his life, politicians tell the public that the death penalty is needed because "that's what the public needs to hear."
The Coalition usually becomes involved after a defendant is sentenced to death, although the public defender's office often asks the
Coalition to provide "court watchers" at trial, people "to sit in a
court room to show support that this person not get the death penalty." Vader emphasized the importance of this role, because it
minimizes some of the more blatant abuses of the system. Vader
recounted one case in which the state's attorney filled the court
room with people who, when the jury returned a guilty verdict,
stood up and chanted, "Kill him, kill him, kill him." Vader emphasized that there has to be somebody on the other side to say,
"No, don't kill him."
Most of the time, however, the Coalition does not get involved
103.
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until the person actually has been sentenced. At that point, Vader
said, the Coalition starts monitoring the individual's progress
through the courts. The Coalition keeps statistics on each individual and his case, so that "we have a thorough working knowledge
of whoever is on death row, so we can provide support in whatever
way we can."
This support involves as much personal contact as possible.
Vader said that the founders of the Coalition became very involved
with the Department of Corrections and finally got permission to
visit. The Coalition visits the two death rows at Menard and Pontiac once a month. "What we do," Vader recounted, "is walk in
the galleries and up to cells and talk to people and find out what
their concerns are ... a way of monitoring the conditions." The
Coalition found that when conditions are monitored, changes frequently are made, or "at least the abuses are kept down to a minimum." Vader said that the prisons "know we're coming once a
month, and they've been very good to us and they've been very
good to the people on death row while we're there at least." The
prisoners say that on that one day the showers are scrubbed down,
and the food is a little better. "If nothing else," Vader said, "we
are accomplishing one day."
Vader described death row. She sees "men caged up in little
bitty cages," cells that are six by eight feet. Vader said that the
inmates spend twenty-two hours a day confined to those cells, getting out only for a shower and an hour in the yard. It's difficult
because "you have people who have a lot of energy stuck in this
little place." The restrictions are total and rigid. Vader finds this
unjust. "There are people on death row who did terrible things,
and we're not going to say that they haven't. And there are people
in the general population who no doubt have done terrible thingsor worse in many cases-yet they're allowed to go to school, allowed to go to church. They're allowed to eat their meals in a
place where they can . . . have an actual plate in front of them.
These guys eat off styrofoam three meals a day."
Vader hears a wide variety of complaints from inmates: "the
law library isn't adequately staffed; . . . my visitor was removed,
and I don't know why; ... could you call my mother and tell her
I'm okay?" Vader stated that the Coalition does everything it can
within the law to remedy those complaints. The Coalition, she
said, has worked a long time to get lawyers for people who cannot
afford them.
The Journalasked Vader about library conditions on death row.
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She said that both death rows have facilities, but there is "not very
up-to-date stuff in the law library." At Menard, for example, the
inmates are locked in a cell in the law library, where a librarian
helps them "gets the books . . . and tries to help them to know
what they mean." Pontiac Prison converted several cells into law
libraries, so the inmates can be locked in with the books and not
have to wait for a librarian to get them. The effectiveness of the
libraries is varied because "many of these people really don't know
even where to start." Vader said that some prisoners become really exceptional jailhouse lawyers "because [their fellow inmates]
have nobody to work with them." Many, however, are illiterate
and can write barely more than their names. Vader said that they
"just sit there and vegetate because there isn't anything else they
can do." Even though Vader thinks that everyone on death row
has a lawyer at this point, "the people who do their own law work
and help other people through trial and error have learned a lot
because they didn't feel their lawyers were following through with
what they should have." Illinois provides lawyers to the inmates
through the state appellate process, but "up until very recently,
after that, if they had other avenues of appeal, but if they couldn't
find a lawyer for free, that was it. They had to do their own
work." But the Public Defender's Capital Resource Center now
pays lawyers to work on postconviction and beyond. "So right
now we're in a better situation financially to actually find lawyers
to work on these cases," she said.
Beyond the physical conditions, the Journal asked Vader to describe the personalities that she sees on death row. Because over
120 people are on death row in Illinois, she found it hard to assign
any particular personality. Vader said that she has seen both horrible and wonderful changes in people. "I've seen some people
come in with really bad attitudes-really violent, hateful people.
And [because] they have more time to think now than they ever
had in their li[ves], I've seen some remarkable changes in people."
Vader has seen people adopt religion as a support and help others
in the process. "Then I've seen people go downhill," she said.
These include "people who maybe have not lost their minds completely, but who have become so fixated and so focused on their
death[s] that it has literally turned them into crazy devils."
Vader sees a lot of remorse among the people who admit their
guilt. She has heard from inmates, "God, one second in the other
direction, and I wouldn't be here. Why did I do that? How did I
do such a thing?" Many people were on drugs or drunk when they
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committed their crimes, Vader said. One man told her, "I must
have committed murder because there was a dead body, and I was
the only person there. But I can't remember." That inmate's toxicology report indicated that he was so intoxicated with drugs when
he committed the murder that he should have been dead. Vader
wondered how he functioned, but it occurred to her that "he didn't
function. He misfunctioned and he killed someone.... This happens a lot.... If drugs or alcohol weren't involved, there probably
wouldn't have been a crime of the magnitude there was." Charles
Walker, for example, had been an alcoholic since the age of eight.
"So it's difficult," Vader observed, "when you look at people who
are sitting on death row and are clean for the first time in their
lives to recognize the [people] that they must have been at some
point."
Vader says that on death row, she has met some very decent
people who are there because they had no economic alternative but
to sell drugs. They wound up taking drugs themselves and killing
someone. "Deep down," she said, "you have some really good
people, some talented people, some creative people, intelligent people. You have all walks of life ... on death row." Vader believes
that if society could take drug abuse, child abuse, and poverty out
of the picture, there would be something different for these people.
"But that's our society," she said. "Our society is loaded with
that, so we have to expect our prisons to be loaded with that. We
shouldn't be surprised that they are."
The Journalasked Vader what else goes through her mind during a visit to death row. She said that although she has visited
death row for five years, she never gets used to seeing "human beings'caged up." At each visit, her first feeling is, "I don't want to
do this. I can't do this anymore. It hurts too much. It's too depressing." But the people she sees are "so remarkable. One of the
things that's so remarkable is that you find so much hope and caring and loving people." Inmates get to know her personally. They
ask about her family and can look at her and say, "something's
wrong. Tell me about it."
Vader says that inmates listen. They care enough to keep track
of her family and her birthday. "Maybe that's because they have a
lot of time," she said, but "when I get there, I walk out with the
feeling that I've had a positive experience. I've met people who've
had very little to hope for, who have a great deal of hope, and who
share that." People on the Coalition, Vader said, go in "because

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

they need to do it, and they know that someone's got to do it. If
we don't do it, who will?"
Illinois' death row contains inmates who are under twenty years
old. Vader spoke about the very young on death row. Her experience indicates that most of them are there because they followed
drugs and gangs, and murdered for them. She found it shocking
that a jury could sentence an eighteen year old to death, saying in a
way, "there's no hope." What shocks her even more is that some
were college or high school graduates. "We have one man who is a
football star who was being sought after by several colleges for
scholarship. We have a champion swimmer who was train[ing] for
the Olympics."
Death row offers no education, said Vader, because "they can't
go to classes like other people who are imprisoned can." Although
the prison system has mandatory classes for those who fail to read
and write at a minimum level, the program does not extend to
death row. Inmates may study for a GED, "but they can't go to a
class as such, so they do a lot of studying on their own." Because
that requires so much motivation, just a few death row inmates
have gotten their GEDs while waiting to die.
Visitor access is another acute problem for death row inmates.
Most of the people who are sentenced to death in Illinois are from
Cook County and the surrounding area. But many death row inmates are housed at Menard Correctional Center, which is 400
miles away from Chicago. Although they are allowed four
monthly visits from family and friends, many visitors cannot afford
to make the trip. Families of death row inmates must either drive
or take an all-night bus trip that leaves Chicago on Saturday night
at midnight. Families who take the bus are allowed to stay in the
prison for a few hours and then are driven back and dropped off on
Sunday at midnight. The bus trip costs thirty-five dollars; even
this price is out of reach for poor families. The Coalition is most
involved in this problem, Vader said.
Even when families make it to the prison, Vader has found that
the Department of Corrections does everything it can to discourage death row visitors. Visiting areas are limited. At Pontiac,
where the general population enjoys a main visiting room with
video games and vending machines, the death row inmates have a
separate visiting room. Vader said, "[T]heir families, their kids
come and are not supposed to play with the video games. They're
not supposed to get food out. They're supposed to sit at the table,
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while everyone else around them is able to move around. So even
when they're inside visiting, they're restricted."
Searches done on death row visitors are much more stringent
than those done on visitors to the general population. "It's hard
enough for a mother to go and see her son on death row," Vader
said, "let alone if she has to go through all these other things....
If she can afford the money to get down to see him, if she can stand
the invasion of her privacy of a very thorough body search, if she
can stand seeing her son sitting at a table in chains, then she's got
to also be treated as if she is a death row inmate by the guards and
everyone around her." Vader sees this as the most horrible thing
about the access problem.
The Journal next asked Vader how prosecutors, judges, victims'
families, and the inmates themselves perceive the Coalition. Vader
responded, "I think that most people think we're bleeding hearts.
You know, 'you're trying to glorify murderers and trying to say
they're nice people.' " She said that the Coalition has had some
really violent and ugly reactions from people. When Coalition
members testify at sentencing hearings, they are "put down a lot by
the prosecutors."
As for the inmates, Vader feels that those who have been around
the Coalition for a while come to trust its members on some levels.
Typically, she said, the inmate's first reaction is to wonder what
these people are doing and what scam they are trying to pull. Inmates have asked Vader if she does it for the money or the power.
But she responds that her pay is low and that she has no real
power.
The Journal asked whether life without parole is a better or
worse alternative than the death penalty. Vader responded that
the Coalition does not advocate any alternative to the death penalty. She did observe, however, that the fear of a murderer killing
again is no reason to support the death penalty, because life without parole is on the books in Illinois. She recognizes the valid
societal concern that some criminals "have done things that are so
horrible that they have probably forfeited their right to ever be out
free again." But, Vader continued, "we can keep them in jail for
the rest of their li[ves], and we can do it a lot cheaper than we can
kill them. So I think life without parole is one of the things that
we're going to have to be looking at as an alternative to the death
penalty." Given that alternative, Vader believes that more people
would reject the death penalty. The Coalition needs to concentrate
more of its resources in this effort, according to Vader. "The death
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penalty system doesn't do what it's supposed to do and it costs a
lot of money. Why not get down to what really can change things,
and maybe life without parole can." She pointed out that Charles
Walker was more afraid of life without parole than he was of the
death sentence. "He wants to die,'I Vader said, "rather than take
a chance that somewhere along the line, his death sentence might
get reversed, and he might get life instead."
When asked about the possibility that an inmate might kill again
within the prison population, Vader responded, "Prisons are dangerous places; and I don't think we will ever stop murders in prisons. There's gang murders. There's inmates who attack guards. I
don't think that's ever going to stop. I don't think the death penalty has stopped it, because we have people on death row who have
killed other people." She believes that the death penalty does not
deter murders either inside or outside of the prisons. "So maybe
they will kill somebody," Vader said. "That's just something
you'll never know."
The Journalasked Vader to comment on Charles Walker, who
at the time of her interview in August not yet been executed.
Vader first said that Walker "comes off as a very charming person." She found him to be very likeable and intelligent. Vader
also offered insights into why Walker gave up fighting for his life.
"What are his reasons? He's given us a lot of reasons. It would be
easier on his family if he were executed. Now, every time his
mother hears that there's a problem at Menard, she worries that
he's involved. . . . [E]veryday that she has to think about him
there, she's grieving."
Vader continued, "[H]e's been in penal institutions most of his
life, so he's seen everything. He's been through everything. He's
tired. He's tired of looking at the bars. He's tired of the discipline.
...He's seen old men dying in prison, and he doesn't want to be
one of those old men ....He's fifty, by the way."
"There's been speculation that since he's a man of faith and a
man who cares about people, there's a lot of remorse there that he
can't live with, a lot of guilt. He truly believes that he deserves to
give his life for what he did.... What's inside of him, who knows?
He's a person who doesn't like people to get inside of him. He
doesn't want you to mess around in his head.... He doesn't want
to really get into in depth conversations about what his real rea104.
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sons are." Vader found Walker "a real tough guy to crack," but a
person who could still contribute a lot to people's lives.
The Journal asked if the same redeemability was present
throughout the death row population. Vader replied that "there is
no one who is completely bad," that everyone has a good side, and
"if I've learned anything,

...

it's that there's good in everybody,

and there are some guys I'm having a lot of trouble finding something good in. But even in the worst, you can find intelligence, you
can find their loving nature, you can find a poet, you can find an
artist. So I would challenge anybody to find somebody who was
completely evil and has no redeeming quality." Of all the people
on death row, she cannot find one without some redeeming quality,
even if it is just a superior intellect.
Surprisingly, Vader found that there might be some value to the
Coalition in making executions public. She believes that "the idea
of public executions goes along with the attitude that it brings out
the ugliness in people." People who are "fence-sitters" on the issue
might see one, she stated, and resolve, "I can't support this."
Vader found an interesting phenomenon in Louisiana, where after
six executions in eight weeks, juries came back more often against
death. She described the horrors of botched executions and said,
"maybe if the public could see this and see what they're supporting, . . . the average person wouldn't be able to stomach it. And

maybe that's what's needed-not under the cover of darkness, not
under the cover of prison walls, right out there for people to see. I
don't know."
V.

CONCLUSION

The death penalty raises political, social, and moral issues that
range far beyond the legal debate. Inquiry into the death penalty
only begins with the court cases. Whether the death penalty is a
valid response to serious crimes is a real-world problem.
This project sought out diverse views from people whose lives
have been influenced by the death penalty. Everyone interviewed
candidly presented their unique experiences with the death penalty
process. Each answered differently the question "is it right?"
Each gave different reasons. The debate will remain as long as society is prepared to take any person's life through the process of
law.

